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REGULATION BY AMICUS: THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S 
POLICY MAKING IN THE COURTS 
Deborah Thompson Eisenberg∗ 
Abstract 
This Article examines the practice of “regulation by amicus”: that is, an 
agency’s attempt to mold statutory interpretation and establish policy by 
filing “friend of the court” briefs in private litigation. Since the United 
States Supreme Court recognized agency amicus interpretations as a source 
of controlling law entitled to deference in Auer v. Robbins, agencies have 
used amicus curiae briefs—in strategic and at times aggressive ways—to 
advance the political agenda of the President in the courts.  
Using the lens of the U.S. Department of Labor’s amicus activity in 
wage and hour cases, this Article explores the tension between the 
extraordinary power and efficiency of agency amicus policy making on the 
one hand, with the harms this less transparent approach may inflict on 
fundamental democratic values such as public participation and separation 
of powers.  
The Article first puts the issue in empirical context by examining the 
nature and impact of the DOL’s amicus filings in 324 Fair Labor Standards 
Act cases from the Roosevelt through Obama administrations. To evaluate 
the normative implications of amicus policy making, the piece then 
juxtaposes the especially active amicus strategies employed by the Bush 
administration—which manipulated deference principles to weaken worker 
protection laws—and the Obama administration—which increased amicus 
filings to revive enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act. This Article 
proposes an analytical framework for judicial review of agency amicus 
arguments that remains faithful to separation of powers—especially to the 
legislative public policy established in remedial statutes like the FLSA. 
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It would be a considerable paradox if before 2001 the 
plaintiffs would win because the President was a Democrat, 
between 2001 and 2009 the defendant would win because the 
President was a Republican, and in 2012 the plaintiffs would 
win because the President is again a Democrat. That would 
make a travesty of the principle of deference to 
interpretations of statutes by the agencies responsible for 
enforcing them, since that principle is based on a belief either 
that agencies have useful knowledge that can aid a court or 
that they are delegates of Congress charged with interpreting 
and applying their organic statutes consistently with 
legislative purpose.1  
INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the practice of “regulation by amicus”: that is, an 
agency’s strategic attempt to mold the interpretation of the law and 
establish policy through the filing of amicus curiae or “friend of the court” 
briefs in private litigation. The amicus strategy provides a powerful tool by 
which agencies may establish and change the law governing federal 
statutes through binding judicial precedents.  
Amicus briefs by the government can be helpful to courts and efficient 
for the agency—providing “more bang for the buck” than traditional 
agency enforcement actions and promoting uniform interpretation of the 
law. But agencies can also improperly exploit amicus filings and 
manipulate judicial deference doctrine to pursue political goals, sometimes 
to the detriment of the statutory purpose with which Congress has 
entrusted them. “Regulation by amicus” can, in some cases, undermine the 
democratic values of accountability, transparency, public participation, and 
reflective, reasoned decision making embodied in the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).2 The APA contemplates that agencies will carry out 
their congressionally delegated mission primarily through formal 
rulemaking3 or adjudication.4 The APA envisions that courts will serve as a 
                                                                                                                     
 1. In this passage from Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012), 
Judge Richard Posner criticized the Department of Labor’s “gyrating” interpretations during the 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations about the compensability under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of the time workers spend donning and doffing protective clothing. 
 2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006); see also Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 697 (2000) (“Whatever the weaknesses of the American Administrative 
Procedure Act—and they are serious—the statute recognizes that regulatory decisionmaking needs 
special forms of legitimation that enhance popular participation, provide ongoing tests for 
bureaucratic claims of knowledge, and encourage serious normative reflection upon the policy 
choices inevitably concealed in abstract statutory guidelines.”).  
 3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559. “[R]ule making” under the APA means “the agency process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” Id. § 551(5). Rulemaking requires that the agency 
provide an opportunity for public notice and comment on the proposed rule. Id. § 553(b)–(e). 
3
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check on the agency’s actions, mandating that courts “shall decide all 
relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions.”5 
As other scholars have noted, the APA’s reservation of legal questions 
to the courts has been weakened by doctrine regarding judicial deference to 
agency interpretations.6 Most notably, in Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,7 the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed judicial 
deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute 
that Congress has charged it with implementing, particularly when that 
interpretation is set forth in regulations developed through notice-and-
comment rulemaking.8  
Since Chevron, deference doctrine has reached far beyond rulemaking 
to include informal agency interpretations and amicus arguments. 
Specifically, in Auer v. Robbins,9 the Court extended controlling Chevron 
deference to an agency’s informal interpretations of its own vague 
regulations set forth—for the first time—in an amicus brief.10 As explored 
in this Article, Auer led to a jubilee of agency amicus activity and court 
confusion about the appropriate level of deference that should be given to 
agency amicus positions, particularly when those positions advanced novel 
theories, contradicted prior agency interpretations, or were not based on 
rulemaking or other formal processes. Recently, in Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,11 the Court upheld Auer but limited its reach 
to exclude cases in which when the agency’s amicus interpretation would 
constitute “unfair surprise”12 to regulated entities or if “there is reason to 
suspect that the agency’s interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair 
and considered judgment on the matter in question.’”13  
Because amicus filings lack the transparency and public participation of 
rulemaking, the practice of “regulation by amicus” has occurred a bit under 
                                                                                                                     
 4. “Adjudication” under the APA means the “agency process for the formulation of an 
order.” Id. § 551(7). So, for example, hearings before the National Labor Relations Board would be 
a form of “adjudication.” 
 5. Id. § 706. 
 6. One scholar has described the judicial review function under the APA as “a dead letter” 
because of the Court’s common law deference frameworks. J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring 
Deference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous 
Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 89 (2010); see also 
Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives 
the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673 (2007). 
 7. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 8. Id. at 865–66. 
 9. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 10. See id. at 461 (holding that the DOL’s amicus interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulation was entitled to deference).  
 11. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).  
 12. Id. at 2167. 
 13. Id. at 2166 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). 
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the radar and has not been comprehensively analyzed by legal scholars. 
Scholarship concerning the impact of amicus briefs generally, or 
administrative deference doctrine more specifically, has focused on judicial 
response. For example, legal scholars have examined how courts—
primarily the U.S. Supreme Court—have applied various doctrines of 
administrative deference to agency interpretations, including those set forth 
in amicus briefs.14 And political scientists have examined the impact of 
amicus curiae filings by the Solicitor General on behalf of federal 
administrative agencies in the Supreme Court.15  
Little to no scholarly analysis has been focused in the opposite 
direction; that is, on the affirmative use of amicus briefs by agencies—in 
strategic and at times aggressive ways—to advance the President’s political 
agenda in the courts. This Article begins to fill that gap, focusing on one 
agency that has been especially active and masterful at using an amicus 
approach to mold policy for the statutes with which Congress entrusted it 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1491–92 (2005) (finding that lower courts have generally waffled 
on the issue of how and why to defer to agency interpretations); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren 
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (analyzing U.S. Supreme Court 
cases between 1984 and 2006 involving an agency’s interpretation of a statute and finding that 
judicial ideology was a significant predictor of outcomes); Foote, supra note 6, at 722–23 (arguing 
that Chevron’s premise that administrative actions are a type of statutory interpretation is flawed 
and allows administrative procedures to displace statutes as a source of law); Kristin E. Hickman & 
Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 
(2007) (discussing revitalization of Skidmore after United States v. Mead); Joseph D. Kearney & 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 743, 828–30 (2000) (concluding that amicus briefs, especially those submitted by the Solicitor 
General, have an impact on the Supreme Court); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873–89 (2001) (proposing a “step zero” to Chevron analysis 
in which the court would decide whether to analyze the issue under Chevron or Skidmore); Thomas 
J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of 
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 870–71 (2006) (finding that application of Chevron framework is 
greatly affected by the judges’ own ideological convictions); Connor N. Raso & William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates 
Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1817 (2010) (concluding that 
formal deference regimes do not predict votes, but justices are likely to vote according to 
ideological influences). 
 15. See, e.g., PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (2008). Professor Collins conducted an empirical study of amicus briefs 
submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court and found “strong support for the Solicitor General’s 
influence in the Court.” Id. at 113. Specifically, “[w]hen the SG argues a liberal position, a justice is 
13% more likely to cast a liberal vote; conversely, when the SG advocates for the conservative 
position, the likelihood of observing a justice cast a conservative vote increases by 13%.” Id.; see 
also Rebecca E. Deen et al., The Solicitor General as Amicus, 1953-2000: How Influential?, 87 
JUDICATURE 60, 68 tbl.6 (2003) (finding that the Solicitor General was more successful as an 
amicus than as a litigant, prevailing a high of 84.6% of the time during the Warren Court and a low 
of 73.1% during the Rehnquist Court). 
5
Eisenberg: Regulation by <i>Amicus</i>:The Department of Labor’s Policy Maki
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1228 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
to enforce: the U.S. Department of Labor. The DOL’s amicus activity in 
cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)16 provides a unique 
lens for analyzing how courts should treat agency amicus arguments. Many 
of the leading agency deference cases—Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,17 Auer v. 
Robbins,18 Christensen v. Harris County,19 Long Island Care at Home, 
Ltd. v. Coke,20 and Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.21—involved 
the DOL offering an interpretation of the FLSA—often for the first time—
in an amicus brief rather than through rulemaking or a direct enforcement 
action.  
In particular, the DOL under President George W. Bush—coming to 
power on the heels of Auer—used deference doctrine as a sword to 
emasculate worker protection statutes. For the first time in the agency’s 
history, the Bush DOL affirmatively filed amicus briefs on behalf of 
employers rather than employees to change the direction of FLSA policy. 
The Bush DOL argued that positions articulated in its amicus briefs should 
be afforded the highest level of deference under Chevron and Auer—even 
where those arguments were inconsistent with long-standing prior agency 
interpretations, were not based on formal rulemaking, and were announced 
for the first time in the amicus brief or in an informal opinion letter issued 
during the pending litigation.22  
The amicus strategy gave the Bush administration a means to change 
the law to benefit favored regulated interests without the public scrutiny 
and compromises involved in promulgating formal regulations pursuant to 
the APA. Indeed, the Bush DOL’s amicus efforts culminated in a 
significant victory in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,23 in which a 
unanimous Court deferred to the agency’s new, pro-employer interpretation 
that home healthcare workers were not entitled to overtime—a position 
that contradicted decades of prior DOL positions that these workers were 
entitled to overtime under the FLSA. After Long Island Care at Home, the 
DOL publicly touted amicus briefs as “a very powerful tool” to influence 
how the Department’s regulations are interpreted by the courts.24  
                                                                                                                     
 16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 17. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 18. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 19. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 20. 551 U.S. 158 (2007). 
 21. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (reviewing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 
383 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 22. See infra Part II.F.1 for examples. 
 23. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171–74. 
 24. Michael R. Triplett, DOL Focus on Amicus Briefs, Opinion Letters Pays Off With 
Increased Deference by Courts, 217 Daily Lab. Rep. Online (BNA) B-1 (Nov. 9, 2007) (reporting 
comments by Paul L. Frieden, head of the appellate litigation department of the DOL Solicitor’s 
Office at the American Bar Association’s Labor and Employment Section meeting on November 8, 
2007). 
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Although the Bush administration was especially adept at using amicus 
briefs to accomplish its political aims of limiting the scope of the FLSA, 
the Obama DOL used amicus briefs even more frequently to revive and 
expand FLSA enforcement. In the four years of its first term, the Obama 
DOL submitted more amicus briefs (forty-three) than the Bush DOL did in 
eight years (twenty-three), partly to reverse certain pro-employer 
interpretations of the Bush DOL.25 In some cases, the Obama DOL’s 
attempts to restore FLSA policy to pre-Bush, pro-employee interpretations 
have been rejected by courts, which have criticized the “gyrating” positions 
of the DOL from the Clinton, to the Bush, to the Obama administrations.26 
Although the Obama DOL so far has a lower success rate with its 
amicus filings than the Bush DOL—with its amicus position prevailing in 
56% of cases that have been decided as compared to the Bush DOL’s 
amicus success rate of 74%—it has achieved significant victories on behalf 
of workers. For example, in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp.,27 the Supreme Court followed the DOL’s position that oral 
complaints of wage violations are protected under the FLSA’s anti-
retaliation clause.28 It suffered a blow, however, in Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham, in which the Court upheld Auer’s principle of 
deference for agency amicus interpretations so long as they do not to create 
“unfair surprise” to regulated entities.29 
The increasingly politically charged nature of both the agency’s amicus 
efforts—as seen during the Bush and Obama administrations in 
particular—and the ideological split in the Supreme Court’s decisions 
about whether to defer to them portends a chaotic future for FLSA 
litigation in the lower courts. But one thing is clear: the agency amicus 
strategy can be a potent tool of policy making. While the Supreme Court 
vacillates about the level of deference, if any, that should be applied to 
amicus arguments, the empirical analysis in this Article shows that lower 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See Jake Blumgart, The Long Fight for Labor: Why is Barack Obama Having Such a 
Difficult Time Undoing Bush-era Damage to the Department of Labor?, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 9, 
2010, http://prospect.org/article/long-fight-labor-0 (“George W. Bush staffed his Department of 
Labor with rigidly pro-business ideologues who allowed the department’s investigative functions to 
wither. Obama promised to end conservative influence over the department, freeing the career staff 
to fulfill the agency’s core missions.”). Although employer groups did not complain about the Bush 
administration’s aggressive amicus strategy that tended to favor employers, they have criticized the 
Obama DOL for active amicus filings on behalf of employees. See News Release, HR Policy 
Association to Scrutinize DOL Activity in the Courts on Wage and Hour Cases (Oct. 2, 2009), 
http://www.hrpolicy.org/issues_story.aspx?gid=543&sid=3356&miid=8&msid=43 (“Well below 
the radar, the Obama DOL is already seeking changes in the wage and hour laws by filing numerous 
amicus briefs in the federal courts trying to reshape the laws in a more plaintiff-friendly manner.”).  
 26. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 27. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 28. Id. at 1336. 
 29. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012) (quoting and 
citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158. 170–71 (2007)). 
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courts have tended to rule consistently with DOL amicus positions, often 
without identifying any particular deference regime or guiding interpretive 
principles.  
This Article shines a light on the phenomenon of regulation by amicus 
to ensure that the integrity of the administrative enforcement process and 
the core remedial intent of worker protection statutes are not lost in the 
midst of the deference battles. Congress’s remedial purpose in passing the 
FLSA guided judicial review of DOL amicus briefs until the age of Auer. 
Although meant to promote uniformity of the law and efficiency for courts, 
Auer has caused confusion and unintended consequences. In particular, the 
Bush DOL used Auer and Chevron to undermine—rather than promote—
the FLSA’s goal of improving conditions for wage earners. The Obama 
DOL zealously used amicus briefs to push FLSA enforcement so broadly 
that it caused corporate and judicial backlash, as seen in Christopher. If 
agency amicus activity is perceived to be guided by the ideology of the 
political party in control of the White House—rather than the core remedial 
intent of worker protection statutes—both the credibility of the DOL and 
its effectiveness as an advocate on behalf of statutory beneficiaries of the 
FLSA will be harmed. 
Using the DOL’s amicus activity in FLSA cases, this Article explores 
the tension between the extraordinary power and efficiency of agency 
amicus briefs on the one hand with the harms amicus policy making may 
inflict on bedrock democratic values such as transparency, public 
participation, and separation of powers on the other. To be sure, having the 
government as a “friend” to weigh in on difficult issues of statutory 
interpretation can help to guide courts through the thicket of complex 
regulatory schemes, such as the FLSA’s web of exemptions and broad 
standards that must be applied to an ever-changing economy. If the DOL 
exercises its amicus power in harmony with the remedial purpose of the 
FLSA, the agency can be a critical, effective voice on behalf of the workers 
who are protected by the FLSA. But amicus briefs and other informal 
guidance also can be more easily, and stealthily, manipulated by regulated 
interests to achieve political aims than traditional administrative processes 
such as rulemaking. Given its greater malleability, amicus policy making 
poses a higher risk of agency capture.30 Because amicus positions can flip-
                                                                                                                     
 30.  “Agency capture” means the agency is unduly influenced by the industries that it is 
charged with regulating. See David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 497 (1999) (“In ‘captured’ agencies, agency regulators do not 
act as ‘arms-length’ representatives of some larger ‘public interest’ in their interaction with 
regulated industries. Instead, government officials work to advance the agenda of current firms in 
the industry by formulating regulations that benefit or at least do not substantially burden the 
industry.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1565 (1992) (“According to the capture hypothesis, instead of providing 
meaningful input into deliberation about the public interest, industry representatives co-opt 
governmental regulatory power in order to satisfy their private desires.”). 
8
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flop quickly with a change in administration, inconsistent agency amicus 
positions may undermine the credibility of the DOL as a technical statutory 
expert, to the detriment of the workers whom Congress sought to protect 
with the FLSA. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background 
information about the DOL and the FLSA and analyzes the doctrinal 
continuum of judicial deference to agency actions from Skidmore through 
Christopher. The empirical analysis in Part II examines the nature and 
impact of DOL amicus filings in 324 FLSA cases from the time the Act 
was passed during the Roosevelt administration in 1938 through the end of 
President Obama’s first term (ending December 31, 2012). This Part then 
juxtaposes the DOL’s amicus activity under the Bush and Obama 
administrations to highlight the benefits and harms of an amicus approach 
to policy making.  
Part III considers the normative implications of the agency amicus 
strategy in the modern administrative state and proposes an analytical 
framework for judicial review of agency amicus activity in the wake of 
Auer and Christopher. The Article argues that deference should not apply 
to amicus arguments where the agency’s interpretation conflicts with 
Congress’s core remedial purpose in enacting worker protection statutes.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part provides background information about the DOL, the FLSA, 
and the nature of the agency deference questions that arise in FLSA cases.  
A.  The Department of Labor and the FLSA 
President William Howard Taft reluctantly added the DOL to the 
presidential cabinet in 1913,31 after decades of lobbying for such a 
department by labor unions and progressives.32 The DOL’s purpose was 
“to foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the 
United States, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their 
opportunities for profitable employment.”33  
                                                                                                                     
 31. See Judson MacLaury, A Brief History: The U.S. Department of Labor (rev. ed. reprinted 
from A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (George T. Kurian ed., 1998)), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/dolhistoxford.htm. President Taft signed the bill just 
hours before President Wilson took office. President Taft’s signing memorandum indicated that he 
signed the bill “with considerable hesitation,” not because he disagreed with the purpose but 
because he thought that “nine departments [were] enough for the proper administration of the 
government” and that a reorganization of departments was required. Memorandum from President 
William Howard Taft, Memorandum to Accompany the Act to Create a Department of Labor, Mar. 
4, 1913, available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/memo.htm. 
 32. See MacLaury, supra note 31 (“A Federal Department of Labor was the direct product of 
a half-century campaign by organized labor for a ‘Voice in the Cabinet,’ and an indirect product of 
the Progressive Movement.”). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 551. 
9
Eisenberg: Regulation by <i>Amicus</i>:The Department of Labor’s Policy Maki
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1232 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
The FLSA is one of the most well-known and controversial34 laws 
enforced by the DOL.35 President Franklin Roosevelt pushed for the FLSA, 
a centerpiece of the New Deal, “to end starvation wages and intolerable 
hours.”36 The legislation overcame several defeats in Congress37 and legal 
challenges to its constitutionality.38 The FLSA aimed to overcome “labor 
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers.”39 The FLSA mandates a minimum wage and overtime pay for 
certain workers and prohibits certain types of child labor.40 With limited 
exceptions, most employers in the United States are now covered by the 
FLSA.41 
Within the DOL, the FLSA is enforced by the Wage and Hour Division, 
led by an Administrator who is appointed by the President and approved by 
the Senate.42 The Administrator is authorized to investigate and gather 
wage data, conduct employer compliance audits, and sue employers for 
violations.43 The FLSA also authorizes the Secretary of Labor to “define 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Business groups have claimed that the FLSA “is an ‘anachronism’ that has become a ‘job 
killer’” while employee advocates caution “that broadening exemptions from the act’s minimum 
wage and overtime protections could result in a ‘race to the bottom’ against foreign competitors that 
would ultimately not serve American employers or U.S. workers.” Lawrence E. Dubé, Business 
Groups, Lawyer Urge FLSA Review, Telling House Panel Legislation is Outdated, 135 Daily Lab. 
Rep. Online (BNA) A-11 (July 14, 2011) (reporting on testimony before the Workforce Protections 
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Education and Workforce Committee). For differing 
perspectives on the FLSA, see The Fair Labor Standards Act: Is it Meeting the Needs of the 
Twenty-First Century Workplace?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the 
H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 36. FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, Annual Message to the Congress, 1938 PUBLIC PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 6 (Samuel I. Rosenman comp., 1941). 
 37. See Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a 
Minimum Wage (rev. ed. reprinted from MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1978), http://www.dol.gov/ 
oasam/programs/history/flsa1938.htm. For historical descriptions of the FLSA, see John S. 
Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 464–
73 (1939), and Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 7–25 (2001) 
(examining historical origins of “short hours movements” that led to the FLSA’s passage).  
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding constitutionality of the 
FLSA).  
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006). 
 40. Id. § 206 (minimum wage); id. § 207 (overtime), id. § 212 (child labor).  
 41. There are two ways in which an employee can be covered by the FLSA. First, the FLSA 
applies to any “enterprises” that employ at least two employees and that have an annual dollar 
volume of sales or business done of at least $500,000. Id. § 203(s)(1)(A). Hospitals, institutions 
providing medical or nursing care for residents, schools, and preschools, and public agencies are 
also covered. Id. § 203(r)(2). Second, individual employees are protected if they are “engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” Id. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1). Even if these 
general coverage provisions are satisfied, the FLSA contains pages of exemptions. Id. § 213.  
 42. Id. § 204(a). 
 43. Id. § 211 (concerning data collection); id. § 216(c) (establishing the powers to audit and 
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and delimit” exemptions from the minimum wage and maximum hour 
requirements.44  
Any government enforcement of the FLSA and other worker protection 
statutes is litigated by the DOL’s Office of the Solicitor.”45 The Solicitor of 
Labor (SOL) is the DOL’s “third highest ranking official and its chief legal 
officer.”46 Like the Wage and Hour Administrator, the Solicitor is also a 
political appointee. “All SOL attorneys report to the Solicitor, rather than 
to client program agency heads, as is the practice in many executive branch 
departments.”47 Consequently, the Solicitor has unique independence and 
power in enforcing the policy priorities of the President under whom he or 
she serves.48  
The basic provisions of the FLSA seem simple on their face: employers 
must pay covered workers at least the minimum wage (originally twenty-
five cents and now $7.25 per hour)49 and pay them “not less than one and 
one-half times” their regular hourly rate for every hour after forty hours 
worked in a week.50 In practice, however, these mandates are complicated 
by a complex web of exceptions to the general rules.51 Two recurring 
issues appear in FLSA case law: (1) whether the plaintiffs are exempt from 
the Act’s requirements and (2) whether certain tasks performed by the 
employee count as “hours worked” for purposes of minimum wage and 
overtime computations.  
Unlike some statutes, which use an administrative process to determine 
whether a particular situation falls under the law,52 Congress designed the 
FLSA to be enforced in the courts in two ways. First, the Secretary of 
Labor may file a direct enforcement action in which the DOL is the 
plaintiff.53 In this scenario, the DOL, like any other plaintiff, would bear 
the burden of proving that the employer violated the statute. Second, 
                                                                                                                     
to sue).  
 44. Id. § 213(a)(1), (a)(15). The Secretary’s FLSA regulations are found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 510–
794.  
 45. OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WORKING FOR AMERICA’S WORKFORCE 2, 
available at http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/brochure/sol.pdf (last visited June 12, 2013). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2006).  
 50. Id. § 207(a)(1). 
 51. To provide a few examples, farmworkers, employees of a “motion picture theater,” 
“domestic service” workers, and various processing workers in the seafood and maple sap industries 
are all exempt from FLSA overtime requirements. See, e.g., id. §§ 213(a)(5), (a)(15), (b)(15), 
(b)(21), (b)(27). 
 52. For example, the DOL adjudicates claims for benefits under various disability 
compensation programs for various workers, such as the Federal Black Lung Program for coal 
miners, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945 (2006), and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Program, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2006).  
 53. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2006). 
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because the DOL lacks the resources to enforce all wage and hour 
violations, Congress allowed employees to sue as “private attorneys 
general,” with the right to recover double liquidated damages and 
attorneys’ fees from the employer if they prevail.54 Whether the case is 
filed by the DOL directly, or by employees on their own behalf, courts 
have the ultimate responsibility to resolve legal issues under the Act. As 
the Supreme Court explained in one of the earliest FLSA cases, 
Kirschbaum v. Walling,55 “the [FLSA] puts upon the courts the 
independent responsibility of applying ad hoc the general terms of the 
statute to an infinite variety of complicated industrial situations.”56  
Given the nature of these questions, FLSA cases often involve intricate 
examination of the statutory text, the Act’s legislative history and 
implementing regulations, and a variety of informal interpretive materials 
developed by the DOL. The most commonly reviewed documents in FLSA 
cases include opinion letters, interpretive bulletins, advisory memoranda, 
field enforcement guides written for wage and hour investigators and, of 
course, agency amicus briefs. 
The interpretive issues in FLSA cases, and the power of the courts to 
ultimately resolve them, offer a rich study of how federal courts have 
addressed the question of how much deference to grant to the agency’s 
regulations, to informal guidance developed without formal rulemaking, 
and to the agency’s positions in amicus briefs. The next section describes 
the agency deference frameworks most frequently invoked in FLSA 
jurisprudence.  
B.  Continuum of Agency Deference Regimes 
Administrative law scholars have recognized that “the Supreme Court’s 
deference jurisprudence is a mess.”57 This section attempts to make sense 
of relevant administrative deference case law to lay a foundation for the 
analysis that follows. 
The application of broad statutory language to precise factual situations 
often gives rise to ambiguity. The Court has attempted to define deference 
principles for agency interpretations of the meaning or application of vague 
statutes or regulations. The level of deference to agency interpretations has 
been described as a continuum ranging from “persuasive weight” under 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. § 216(b). 
 55. 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (holding landlords’ employees covered under the FLSA). 
 56. Id. at 523. 
 57. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14, at 1157; see also Goering, supra note 6, at 22 
(describing deference case law as “mish-mash of a muddled mess”); Ann Graham, Searching for 
Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 262 (2008) (referring to “a confusing muddle of decisions which turn on 
internecine disputes, back-filling from the desired result, and flavor-of-the-week analytical 
models”).  
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Skidmore to binding deference under Chevron.58 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., one of the first deference cases, continues to 
figure prominently in modern administrative law.59 In Skidmore, seven 
employees at a packing plant sued their employer under the FLSA arguing 
that the time the employer required them to be “on call” constituted hours 
worked for overtime purposes.60 The Administrator of the Wage and Hour 
Division submitted an amicus brief,61 arguing that all of the time that the 
workers spent on duty, including waiting time, constituted compensable 
time under the FLSA.62 
The Court noted the fact-intensive nature of the question presented and 
emphasized the Court’s duty to determine the application of the law.63 The 
Court explained that in the FLSA, “Congress did not utilize the services of 
an administrative agency to find facts and to determine in the first instance 
whether particular cases fall within or without the Act. Instead, it put this 
responsibility on the courts.”64 But, the Court noted, Congress created the 
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division and “put on him the duties 
of bringing injunction actions to restrain violations.”65 To carry out this 
enforcement function, the Administrator developed “an interpretative 
bulletin” and informal rulings that “provide[d] a practical guide to 
employers and employees as to how the office representing the public 
interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it.”66  
In its amicus brief in Skidmore, the agency described the prior 
Interpretative Bulletin that set forth general standards and examples 
designed to guide the determination of the compensability of waiting time. 
Although none of the examples in the Bulletin dealt specifically with the 
type of employees involved in Skidmore, the Administrator’s amicus brief 
applied the Bulletin to the factual scenario at issue and concluded that all 
on-call time was compensable except for sleeping and eating time. 
The Court stated that the agency’s interpretation, although not reached 
by trial in an adversary form, was nevertheless entitled to respect. The oft-
quoted passage from Skidmore provided that the agency’s enforcement 
experience and informed judgment may provide helpful guidance to courts 
and litigants:  
                                                                                                                     
 58. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14.  
 59. See, e.g., Hickman & Krueger, supra note 14, at 1236. 
 60. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135–36 (1944). 
 61. The DOL is represented by the U.S. Solicitor General in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 62. Brief of the Adm’r of the Wage and Hour Div. as Amicus Curiae, Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (No. 12), 1944 WL 42828. 
 63. 323 U.S. at 136–37 (“Whether in a concrete case such [waiting] time falls within or 
without the Act is a question of fact to be resolved by appropriate findings of the trial court.”). 
 64. Id. at 137. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 138. 
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We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of 
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon 
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of 
such a judgment in a particular case will depend on the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.67  
Skidmore recognized that context matters. That context includes the 
underlying remedial purpose of the statute, the agency’s enforcement role 
pursuant to that statute, the circumstances that led to the agency guidance, 
and the consistency and integrity of the agency’s interpretation vis-à-vis the 
remedial purpose of the law. The agency, in this sense, is akin to an expert 
witness providing an additional factual data point to the court,68 with the 
court ultimately responsible for interpreting and enforcing legislative will. 
Contrast Skidmore with Chevron.69 Chevron resulted from a battle 
between environmental groups and various industries over the definition of 
“stationary sources” of air pollution under the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1977.70 The Clean Air Act capped emissions levels from “stationary 
sources” but did not define the term.71 After notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and intense lobbying efforts from stakeholders, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decided “to allow States to treat 
all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as 
though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’ . . . .”72 The Natural 
Resources Defense Council challenged the new regulation.73 
In Chevron, a unanimous Court74 upheld the regulation as a reasonable 
construction of the statute and announced the famous two-step agency 
deference framework. Under step one, the court should determine whether 
Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”75 If so, the 
court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Id. at 140 (emphasis added). 
 68. See Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 997, 1042 (2007) (arguing that Skidmore “should be read as requiring courts to take agency 
views into account as a relevant data point when independently construing statutory ambiguity”). 
 69. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 70. Id. at 839–40. 
 71. See id. at 866. 
 72. Id. at 840. 
 73. Id. at 837. 
 74. Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O’Connor did not participate in the decision. Id. at 866. 
 75. Id. at 842. 
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Congress.”76 Under step two, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”77 
The Court found that the EPA’s new stationary source rule “represent[ed]  
a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and [was] 
entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme [was] technical and complex, 
the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and 
the decision involve[d] reconciling conflicting policies.”78 
As in Skidmore, the Court expressed respect for the experience and 
expertise of the agency charged with administering the statute. But unlike 
the Court in Skidmore, which emphasized the judiciary’s responsibility to 
be the ultimate interpreter of a statute’s purpose and scope, the Chevron 
Court urged deference to the agency’s policy choices, at least those made 
via a rulemaking process, because of the greater political accountability of 
the executive branch. The Court advised that if the agency has resolved 
competing views of the public interest in a reasonable way, “federal 
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate 
policy choices made by those who do.”79 
In Auer v. Robbins,80 the Court extended Chevron deference far beyond 
rulemaking to informal agency interpretations in amicus briefs. Auer was 
filed by police sergeants seeking overtime wages under the FLSA.81 The 
police department claimed that the officers were exempt as “bona fide 
executive, administrative, or professional” employees.82 The officers 
contended that the employer lost the exemption because the personnel 
manual permitted pay deductions for disciplinary infractions, even though 
no deductions were actually made.83 In its amicus brief, filed at the Court’s 
request, the DOL explained that the employer may lose the administrative 
exemption when employers make actual deductions from pay, but not 
when there is only a theoretical possibility of such deductions.84 Applying 
this rule, the DOL agreed that the employer did not lose the benefit of the 
exemption and that the officers were not entitled to overtime.  
                                                                                                                     
 76. Id. at 842–43. 
 77. Id. at 843. 
 78. Id. at 865. 
 79. Id. at 866. See also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14, at 1085 (explaining Chevron); 
Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, supra note 14, at 853–56 (comparing the Skidmore and 
Chevron doctrines).  
 80. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 81. Id. at 455. 
 82. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy this 
exemption, the employer bears the burden of satisfying two tests: (1) the employee must be paid on 
a salaried, rather than hourly, basis; and (2) the employee must perform duties that show sufficient 
degrees of discretion and managerial functions.  
 83. Auer, 519 U.S. at 455. 
 84. Id. at 461. 
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Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court in Auer, invoked 
Chevron to defer to the agency’s amicus interpretation. The Court 
explained that the fact that the Secretary’s interpretation came in the form 
of an amicus curiae brief did not make it unworthy of deference.85 The 
Court found that the agency’s position was not a litigation position or 
“‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past 
agency action against attack” and that there was “simply no reason to 
suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question.”86 
Under Auer, an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulations is binding and entitled to deference unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.87 Some scholars have argued 
that Auer affords a type of “super-deference” even greater than Chevron 
and have advocated for its reversal.88 Auer effectively enshrined an 
agency’s amicus arguments as controlling law. As one scholar wrote: 
“What set Auer apart was that it granted super-deference to an informal 
agency interpretation expressed in an amicus brief that the Court had 
specifically requested.”89  
Upon examination of the DOL’s actual amicus arguments in Auer, it is 
unclear what all of the deference fuss was really about: the Court could 
have reached the same result if it simply had applied Skidmore. The DOL 
did the same thing in its Auer amicus brief as it had done in Skidmore: 
describe and apply the applicable law and existing agency guidance to the 
factual scenario before the Court. Indeed, the DOL had urged the Supreme 
Court not to grant certiorari in Auer because the issue involved was so fact-
bound and the governing law settled.90 In its amicus brief, the agency did 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Id. at 462 (“Petitioners complain that the Secretary's interpretation comes to us in the 
form of a legal brief; but that does not, in the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of 
deference.”). 
 86. Id. at 462 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)) 
(alteration in original). 
 87. Auer deference has been compared to an earlier case, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand 
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), which was decided on the heels of Skidmore. In Seminole Rock, the 
Office of Price Administration filed suit to enjoin a manufacturer of crushed stone from violating 
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and its implementing regulations. Seminole Rock, 325 
U.S. at 412. The Court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, which it 
characterized as having “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.” Id. at 414.  
 88. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14, at 1184 (urging Court to abrogate Seminole 
Rock); Goering, supra note 6, at 50 (arguing that Auer “‘super deference’ . . . cannot be reconciled 
with Chevron’s ‘two-step’ approach” and has, in effect, “abdicate[d] judicial responsibility for 
resolving ambiguities”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 614–16 (1996) (criticizing 
Seminole Rock). 
 89. Goering, supra note 6, at 49. 
 90. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–8, 
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not argue for any novel legal interpretation or request Chevron-like 
deference. The agency’s views were persuasive because the interpretation 
was venerable and established long before the case. Even though the Court 
did not need to reach for a new “super deference” standard, Justice Scalia 
proclaimed that the agency’s amicus views should be afforded the highest 
level of deference under Chevron.  
Three years after Auer, a divided Court seemed to reverse course on the 
degree of deference to give to an informal agency interpretation in 
Christensen v. Harris County.91 In a split decision, the Court refused to 
defer to a DOL position in an opinion letter and amicus brief that the FLSA 
prohibited state employers from compelling employees to use accrued 
compensatory time in the absence of a prior agreement or understanding 
authorizing compelled use.92 The Court held that “[i]nterpretations such as 
those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy 
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack 
the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”93 Justice 
Clarence Thomas, for the majority, wrote: “To defer to the agency’s 
position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a 
regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.”94After “a doctrinal tug of 
war within the Supreme Court” about the scope of Chevron and continuing 
viability of Skidmore,95 the Court attempted to reconcile Skidmore and 
Chevron in United States v. Mead Corp.96 The Mead Court held that a 
letter ruling by the Customs Service regarding the characterization of an 
import item for tariff purposes was not entitled to Chevron deference, but 
may be entitled to respect under Skidmore.97 The Court clarified that 
“administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies 
for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to 
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise 
of that authority.”98 The Court also confirmed the continuing vitality of 
Skidmore—which had been in some doubt99—instructing that it should be 
                                                                                                                     
Auer v. Robbins, 419 U.S. 452 (No. 95-897), 1996 WL 33414029.  
 91. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 92. Id. at 588. 
 93. Id. at 587. 
 94. Id. at 588. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, agreeing that the DOL’s position did 
not seem to be a reasonable interpretation of the statute, but arguing that the DOL’s amicus brief, 
standing alone, and opinion letter were entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 95. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14, at 1088. 
 96. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 97. Id. at 221. 
 98. Id. at 226–27. 
 99. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 14, at 1243 (2007) (describing debate about 
Skidmore’s viability after Chevron). 
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used when such delegated lawmaking authority does not exist. Mead did 
not, however, overrule Auer. 
After Christensen and Mead, the Court swung back again to Auer-like 
deference for informal agency interpretations in Long Island Care at Home 
Ltd. v. Coke.100 Long Island Care at Home went even farther than Auer. 
Whereas Auer involved the application of a well-established agency 
position to a new factual scenario, Long Island Care at Home deferred to 
the DOL’s change in policy during pending litigation, expressed for the 
first time in an amicus brief and informal agency guidance, to support a 
litigant who had lost in the trial court—and a regulated entity to boot.101 
In this case, the Bush administration argued—contrary to prior 
longstanding DOL positions—that in-home companionship workers who 
work for home healthcare companies were exempt from overtime.102 It did 
not bother the Court that the DOL’s interpretation “had sometimes been 
circuitous and inconsistent”103 or that the agency’s new interpretation was 
set forth in an informal Advisory Memorandum prepared in response to a 
court defeat for the employer. Citing Auer, the Court found that the change 
in interpretation did not provide reason to disregard the DOL’s new 
position and that the agency’s position was entitled to deference so long as 
it did not create “unfair surprise.”104 
During the Obama administration, the Court shifted back to reliance on 
Skidmore and Mead to defer to the DOL’s amicus position in Kasten v. 
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.105 Specifically, the Court gave 
“a degree of weight” to the DOL’s view that the FLSA anti-retaliation 
provision covered employees who made internal oral complaints about 
wage violations to employers.106 Some circuits had found that only written 
wage complaints filed with the agency or in court constituted activity 
immune from retaliation.107 The Court found the DOL’s amicus position 
reasonable because the agency had held the position since at least 1961 and 
had reaffirmed that interpretation numerous times in subsequent amicus 
filings.108 The Court concluded that the “length of time” the DOL held the 
view “reflect[ed] careful consideration” and “add[ed] force” to the Court’s 
                                                                                                                     
 100. 551 U.S. 158 (2007). 
 101. See id. at 174. 
 102. Id. at 161–62. 
 103. See Michael R. Triplett, Justices Rule 9-0 that Home Health Workers Employed by Third 
Parties Not Owed Overtime, 112 Daily Lab. Rep. Online (BNA) AA-1 (June 12, 2007).  
 104. Long Island Care at Home at 170. The Article returns to the backstory behind the Long 
Island Care at Home case in Part II.F. 
 105. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 106. Id. at 1335. 
 107. See, e.g., Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated by Kasten v. 
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (holding anti-retaliation 
protection did not cover oral complaints). 
 108. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335. 
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conclusion that oral complaints were protected.109  
These competing deference doctrines from Auer/Long Island Care at 
Home on the one hand and Mead/Christensen on the other came to a head 
in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp..110 The case concerned 
whether pharmaceutical representatives fell within the “outside sales” 
exemption of the FLSA.111 In 2009, the DOL began to file amicus briefs in 
private litigation arguing that pharmaceutical detailers—who promote 
pharmaceutical products to physicians but are prohibited by law from 
selling them to doctors—are not exempt from overtime because they do 
not “sell” as that term is defined in the outside sales exemption.112 The 
Second Circuit had deferred to the DOL’s interpretation set forth in an 
amicus brief.113 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit criticized the DOL for using 
its “appearance as amicus to draft a new interpretation of the FLSA’s 
language.”114  
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously found that the DOL’s amicus 
position in Christopher was not entitled to deference.115 Although the DOL 
had not changed its position that pharmaceutical detailers were entitled to 
overtime because they did not satisfy the definition of the outside sales 
exemption, the Court refused to defer because the agency’s reasoning—
that is, the legal argument in its brief—about why detailers were covered 
by the Act had changed in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court as 
compared to its briefs in the circuit courts below.116 This is perplexing 
given the Court’s unanimous deference to an agency’s complete about-
face—from a pro-employee to pro-industry position during pending 
litigation—in Long Island Care at Home. 
The conservative majority117 in Christopher went one step further to 
add a surprising gloss to Auer deference that elevated the concerns of 
regulated businesses over that of statutory beneficiaries. Although well-
established FLSA precedent dictates that the Act must be interpreted 
liberally to effectuate Congress’s remedial purpose,118 and that any 
exemptions from the law should be narrowly construed against the 
employer,119 the majority’s dicta turned these principles on their head. The 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Id. 
 110. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 111. Id. at 2161. 
 112. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2006). 
 113. See In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 
(2012). 
 114. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 395 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 115. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69. 
 116. Id. at 2169–70. 
 117. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. 
 118. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296 (1985).  
 119. See, e.g., Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960). 
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Court expressed concern that the pharmaceutical company would be 
exposed to “potentially massive liability” if required to pay overtime.120 
The Court noted that the DOL had never instituted an enforcement action 
against the employer and announced its position that pharmaceutical 
detailers were not exempt for the first time in an amicus brief.121 The 
majority concluded: “To defer to the agency’s interpretation in this 
circumstance would seriously undermine the principle that agencies should 
provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] 
prohibits or requires.’”122 No deference is warranted, the Court said, if it 
would constitute “unfair surprise” to employers.123 Justice Alito dropped a 
vague footnote stating that the longstanding principle that exemptions must 
be narrowly construed against employers was “inapposite where, as here, 
we are interpreting a general definition that applies throughout the 
FLSA.”124  
The Court’s approach to deference doctrine from Auer to Christopher 
reflects an ideological, results-oriented approach. While the conservative 
justices have strongly deferred to the DOL’s position when it has favored 
employers—as in Auer and Long Island Care at Home—they have refused 
to defer to DOL positions that have favored workers, as in Christopher and 
Christensen.125 With the exception of Christopher, the liberal-leaning 
justices have deferred to the DOL in all cases, even those in which the 
agency interpretation favored business. Although the liberal justices did 
not defer to the DOL’s interpretation in Christopher, they ruled 
consistently with the DOL’s position that the employees were entitled to 
overtime—finding that pharmaceutical detailers did not meet the test for 
the outside sales exemption because they were prohibited by law from 
actually conducting any sales.  
Christopher adds a spin on deference doctrine that may be especially 
worrisome for the DOL’s future efforts to enforce worker protection 
statutes. In short, the Court’s latest ruling sets up a regime in which the 
agency may advance amicus arguments that withdraw FLSA protection for 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 121. Id. at 2168. 
 122. Id. at 2167 (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
 123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124. Id. at 2171 n.21. 
 125. Id. The majority in Christensen included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter. Christensen v, Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 577 (2000). 
Justice Scalia concurred, arguing that agency positions, even in opinion letters and amicus briefs, 
should be afforded Chevron deference, but found, without explanation, that the DOL’s position was 
nevertheless “unreasonable.” Id. at 589–91. The dissent included Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, 
both Clinton appointees, plus Justice Stevens, a Ford appointee who ruled more consistently with 
Democratically appointed justices over time. An exception is Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011), in which the only dissenters were Justices Scalia and 
Thomas. Id. at 1336. 
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workers and interpret the law to favor the regulated—as was the case in 
Long Island Care at Home. But agency efforts to advance arguments on 
behalf of workers might be rejected if regulated entities are subjected to 
“unfair surprise” by an amicus brief supporting liability. Because the DOL 
is such an active litigant and amicus curiae, lower federal courts will 
undoubtedly be sorting through how Christopher fits into deference 
doctrine. The Article returns to this question in Part III to help guide courts 
through that task. 
The next Part puts the recent explosion of agency amicus activity in 
empirical context by tracing the extraordinary, albeit often hidden, impact 
that DOL amicus arguments have had in shaping FLSA policy.  
II.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DOL AMICUS ACTIVITY IN FLSA CASES 
FROM ROOSEVELT TO OBAMA 
A.  Methodology 
The dataset for the empirical analysis consisted of all DOL amicus 
curiae briefs in FLSA cases since its passage in 1938 through December 
31, 2012. Briefs were identified and obtained from multiple sources. First, 
most of the amicus briefs for the Bush and Obama administration were 
obtained from the website of the DOL’s Office of Solicitor.126 Second, 
searches were conducted in Westlaw and LEXIS to find any cases in which 
the U.S. Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor, or the Administrator 
of the Wage and Hour Division were identified as amicus curiae. Third, 
briefs not available on public electronic databases were obtained from the 
DOL through a Freedom of Information Act request or reviewed at the 
DOL law library.127 Many of the older briefs were in such poor condition 
that they were reviewed and indexed at the DOL library.  
All amicus briefs and the corresponding cases in which they were filed 
were reviewed and coded based on twenty-five variables.128 The resulting 
                                                                                                                     
 126. See SOL Briefs, U.S. DEPT’ OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/main.htm (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2012). 
 127. A FOIA request to the Bush DOL went completely unanswered. Letter to Paul DeCamp, 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor Employment Standards Div. (Nov. 13, 2008) (on file with author). The Obama 
administration responded to updated FOIA request. The DOL does not maintain a centralized 
collection of all amicus curiae briefs it has filed.  The DOL Wirtz Labor Law Library had some 
older amicus briefs that had been donated by the Solicitor of Labor’s office at some point, but the 
collection is incomplete. Starting with the administration of George W. Bush, most, but not all, of 
the DOL’s amicus curiae briefs have been posted on the agency’s website. 
 128. These variables are: (1) case name and citation; (2) year of the court decision; (3) the 
court in which the brief was filed; (4) the author of the majority opinion; (5) the President who 
appointed the author of the opinion (if a federal judge); (6) the author of any dissenting opinion; 
(7) the President who appointed the dissenting judge; (8) whether the dissenting opinion discussed 
the appropriate level of deference; (9) the counsel for the employee(s); (10) counsel for the 
employer; (11) the level at which the DOL became involved as an amicus in the case (district court, 
court of appeals, U.S. Supreme Court, or state court); (12) the holding in the case; (13) whether the 
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database consisted of 324 FLSA cases, which are listed by presidential 
administration in the Appendix.129  
It is possible that some cases in which the DOL filed FLSA amicus 
briefs, especially prior to the Reagan administration, were not identified, 
but there is no indication from case research or from the DOL that there are 
more briefs. The DOL reported in response to my FOIA request that it may 
have discarded some old briefs during office moves. There are twenty-two 
cases for which case research indicated that the DOL filed an amicus brief 
in the case but the agency’s brief is no longer available.130 For the cases for 
which the DOL’s amicus briefs are no longer available, the judicial 
opinions alone were analyzed. The database of briefs from the Clinton, 
Bush, and Obama administrations—which were the first to advance 
deference arguments consistently and form the core of this Article’s 
analysis—are believed to be complete.  
B.  Overview of DOL Amicus Activity from Roosevelt to Obama 
Some scholars have observed that the submission of amicus briefs, by 
the government and by private groups, has skyrocketed in recent years.131 
                                                                                                                     
decision was consistent with the DOL’s amicus position, regardless of whether the amicus brief or 
deference principles were discussed; (14) which party prevailed (employer or employee); (15) the 
level of deference, if any, that the DOL argued in its brief; (16) the deference case(s) or principle(s) 
cited or discussed in the court’s opinion; (17) the type of agency interpretation for which the DOL 
requested deference (e.g., regulation, opinion letter or other informal agency guidance, amicus 
argument); (18) summary of the DOL’s argument in its amicus brief; (19) the President who was in 
office at the time the DOL filed the brief; (20) the President who was in office at the time the court 
ruled in the case; (21) the statute under which the plaintiff sued (all FLSA); (22) whether the DOL 
requested deference for an opinion letter(s); (23) the date that any opinion letter(s) for which the 
DOL requested deference was issued; (24) whether the court requested DOL amicus participation; 
and (25) whether the court asked the DOL for supplemental amicus briefing. 
 129. See infra Appendix. 
 130. The cases for which the DOL’s amicus briefs are no longer available include: Alewine v. 
City Council of Augusta, 699 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1983); Weisel v. Singapore Joint Venture, Inc., 
602 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1979); Williams v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 477 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Asker v. Stephens, 394 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1968); Childress v. Earl Whitley Enters., Inc., 388 F.2d 
742 (4th Cir. 1968); Cont’l/Moss-Gordin, Inc. v. Harp, 386 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1967); Allen v. Atl. 
Realty Co., 384 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967); Rachal v. Allen, 321 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1963); Norman v. 
Moseley, 313 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1963); Goldstein v. Dabanian, 291 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1961); 
Caserta v. Home Lines Agency, Inc., 273 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1959); Crook v. Bryant, 265 F.2d 541 
(4th Cir. 1959); Sams v. Beckworth, 261 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1958); Mateo v. Auto Rental Co., 240 
F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1957); Thomason v. Alester G. Furman Co., 222 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1955); E.I. 
Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Harrup, 227 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1955); Clougherty v. James Vernor 
Co., 187 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1951); United States Cartridge Co. v. Powell, 185 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 
1950); Grant v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 172 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1949); Brenna v. Federal 
Cartridge Corp., 174 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1949); Chapman v. Home Ice Co., 136 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 
1943); Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Peterson 
v. McDonald, 73 F. Supp. 840 (D. Minn. 1947); Belanger v. Hopeman Bros., Inc., 6 F.R.D. 459 (D. 
Me. 1947); Brewer v. Cent. Greenhouse Corp., 352 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1961). 
 131. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 754 (noting increase in the mean number of 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/4
2013] REGULATION BY AMICUS 1245 
 
That is not true for the DOL’s amicus activity, which was at its peak during 
the New Deal, although the nature of the activity has changed dramatically 
over time. Overall DOL amicus activity in FLSA cases by presidential 
administration is reflected in Table1: 
Table 1:  DOL Amicus Activity in FLSA Cases by Administration 
(through December 31, 2012) 
 
President at Time of Filing Number of Amicus 
Briefs Filed
Roosevelt 96
Truman 74
Eisenhower 19
Kennedy 3
Johnson 9
Nixon 14
Ford 3
Carter 7
Reagan 7
Bush I 4
Clinton 22
Bush 23
Obama 43
 
Total FLSA Amicus Briefs 324
 
The most active DOL amicus curiae activity in FLSA cases occurred 
immediately after the Act’s passage. After the battle to achieve passage of 
the FLSA, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations used amicus briefs to 
establish judicial precedents broadly construing the scope of the FLSA’s 
protections.132 Indeed, more than half of all FLSA amicus briefs in the 
database (170 out of 324 briefs) were filed by these two administrations. 
Many of these early DOL amicus efforts, such as Skidmore, remain 
important precedents in employment and administrative law. Most of the 
cases involved questions about the FLSA’s scope and fell into three basic 
categories: first, briefs arguing that the employees in question were 
engaged in “interstate commerce” and therefore covered by the Act;133 
                                                                                                                     
amicus briefs per case from about 0.50 in the late 1940s to 4.23 in the 1990s); Kirstin Lustila, 
Ethical Duties of Expert Supreme Court Counsel, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 659, 665 (2011) 
(reporting that the number of amicus filings in support of petitions for certiorari in the Supreme 
Court increased by more than 40% from 1982 to 2002).  
 132. See infra Appendix. 
 133. See, e.g., Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 92–93 (1942) (holding that 
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second, briefs arguing that various tasks were work activities that should 
be included in the calculation of “hours worked;”134 and third, briefs 
arguing that purported waivers from the FLSA’s protection were not 
enforceable.135  
Another surprising finding was the number of early amicus briefs filed 
in state appellate courts, which have concurrent jurisdiction over FLSA 
claims.136 The Roosevelt administration filed twenty-five amicus briefs in 
state appellate courts.137 Roosevelt also filed forty-nine amicus briefs in the 
federal courts of appeal and twenty-two in the U.S. Supreme Court.  
The number of agency amicus briefs in FLSA cases declined 
dramatically during subsequent administrations. Eisenhower’s DOL filed 
nineteen briefs; Kennedy, three; Johnson, nine; Nixon, fourteen; Ford, 
three; Carter, seven; Reagan, seven; and Bush I, four.138 There are several 
possible explanations for the decline in the DOL’s filing of amicus briefs 
in FLSA cases after the Truman administration. First, the scope of the 
FLSA became relatively well established during the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations, with thirty Supreme Court opinions clarifying its basic 
coverage. As the FLSA became a more routine aspect of doing business, 
the agency’s amicus appearances may not have been as necessary. Second, 
the number of statutes being enforced by the DOL increased substantially 
and amicus efforts shifted to shaping the contours of the new statutes. 
                                                                                                                     
oil rig workers were engaged in interstate commerce and therefore covered by the FLSA); 
Overstreet v. N. Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 132 (1943) (holding employees who maintained toll 
road were engaged in interstate commerce); McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1943) 
(holding cooks not engaged in interstate commerce); Walton v. S. Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540, 
542–43 (1944) (holding that a watchman was engaged in interstate commerce); Borden Co. v. 
Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 684 (1945) (holding maintenance employees are engaged in interstate 
commerce if they work in a building that is engaged in interstate commerce); 10 East 40th St. Bldg., 
Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 583 (1945) (holding that renting office space was “local business” and 
not interstate commerce). 
 134. See, e.g., Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946) (holding 
walking time and preliminary activities may be compensable time under FLSA if not “de minimis”); 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (holding that waiting time is compensable). 
 135. See, e.g., 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 209–10 (1947) (holding 
work agreement did not deprive employees of right to overtime compensation); Martino v. Mich. 
Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173, 177–78 (1946) (holding work agreement did not deprive 
employees of right overtime compensation). 
 136. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). FLSA claims filed in state court today are typically 
removed to federal court by the employer. 
 137. See, e.g., Colbeck v. Dairyland Creamery Co., 17 N.W.2d 262 (S.D. 1945); Umthun v. 
Day & Zimmerman, 16 N.W.2d 258 (Iowa 1944); Stoike v. First Nat’l Bank of N.Y., 48 N.E.2d 
482 (N.Y. 1943); Floyd v. Du Bois Soap Co., 41 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio 1942); Johnson v. Phillips-
Buttorff Mfg. Co., 160 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. 1942); Ikola v. Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Co., 121 P.2d 
369 (Wash. 1942) (en banc); Tidewater Optical Co. v. Wittkamp, 19 S.E.2d 897 (Va. 1942); Reck 
v. Zarnocay, 33 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 17 
N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
 138. See infra Appendix (listing cases by administration). 
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While the number of FLSA amicus briefs declined, the DOL continued to 
appear as an amicus curiae (and frequent litigant) in cases involving the 
many other statutes which it enforced.139 For example, the Kennedy 
administration focused its litigation efforts on enforcing the nascent Equal 
Pay Act. The Carter administration also vigorously litigated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act.  
In addition to its amicus efforts, the DOL files direct enforcement 
actions under the FLSA and other worker protection statutes, which can 
dominate the resources of the Solicitor of Labor’s office. According to a 
former attorney who worked in the appellate division of the DOL’s Office 
of Solicitor from 1978 to 2005, amicus filings during the Carter, Reagan, 
and Bush I administrations were rare and tended to be submitted only in 
response to a specific court request.140 Prior to the Clinton administration, 
the DOL focused the resources of the Office of Solicitor on direct 
enforcement efforts, in which the agency filed suit as a plaintiff on behalf 
of employees.141 Attorneys were simply too busy with their own litigation 
dockets to monitor and become embroiled in private litigation as an 
amicus.142 
Under President Clinton, the DOL once again began to submit amicus 
curiae briefs in private FLSA litigation with greater frequency, filing 
twenty-two amicus briefs. The Clinton administration’s amicus activity 
was an extension of beefed up wage and hour enforcement efforts on 
behalf of low-wage workers, which focused largely on the misclassification 
of employees in certain industries as exempt from the FLSA. These cases 
included, for example, Heath v. Perdue Farms, Inc.,143 which held that 
chicken catchers had been misclassified as independent contractors and 
                                                                                                                     
 139. The statutes enforced by the DOL are too numerous to list here, but the most well known 
and actively litigated include the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–
678 (2006), which establishes health and safety standards; the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006), which regulates employers who offer 
pension or welfare benefits to employees; the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601–2654 (2006), which provides up to twelve weeks of unpaid job-protected leave to certain 
employees for serious medical conditions or after the birth or adoption of a child; and a host of 
other employment laws dealing with unemployment, whistleblowers, labor management, mine 
safety, workers’ compensation, veterans, and standards for particular types of occupations and 
government contracts. For information about laws enforced by the DOL, see Summary of the Major 
Laws of the Department of Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/ 
lawsprog.htm (last visited June 14, 2013). In addition, at one time the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 206(d) (2006), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 621–634 (2006), were enforced by the DOL because these laws are subsections of the FLSA. 
They were eventually transferred to the EEOC for enforcement. 
 140. Telephone Interview with Leif Jorgenson, former Appellate Counsel for the DOL Office 
of the Solicitor (Sept. 14, 2011) (notes on file with author). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  
 143. 87 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2000). 
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were entitled to overtime;144 Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc.,145 
which held that migrant farmworkers were engaged in seasonal work and 
were protected by the FLSA;146 and Torres-Lopez v. May,147 and Antenor v. 
D&S Farms,148 which held that the growers and labor contractors were 
joint employers under the FLSA.149 The DOL also filed amicus briefs in 
several cases involving the same issue as in Auer: whether docking salaried 
employees’ pay caused the loss of the “white collar” exemption.150  
During the Bush administration the number of DOL amicus filings in 
FLSA cases increased to twenty-three.151 Many of these briefs—for the 
first time in the DOL’s history—were filed on behalf of employers rather 
than employees. The Bush DOL submitted ten amicus briefs in favor of 
employers in FLSA cases152 and twelve in favor of employees.153 One brief 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Id. at 454, 457–59, 463. 
 145. 993 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 146. Id. at 1507, 1513–14. 
 147. 111 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 148. 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 149. Id. at 937–38; Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 642–44. 
 150. See, e.g., Klem v. Santa Clara, 208 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000); Belcher v. Shoney’s, 
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1011 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). 
 151. See infra Appendix. 
 152. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Long Island 
Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) (No. 06-593), 2007 WL 579234; Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 
538 U.S. 691 (2003) (No. 02-337), 2003 WL 1192669; Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(No. 06-1259), 2006 WL 1911678; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing, Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1055); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defendant-Appellant, Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(No. 06-11032); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-
Appellees, Cook v. Diana Hays & Options, Inc., 212 F. App’x 295, 296 (5th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-
30856); Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 
462 F.3d 48 (2nd Cir. 2006); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Gieg v. DDR, Inc., 
407 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-35619); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Defendant-Appellee Delta Recycling Corp. Supporting Affirmance of the District 
Court, Niland v. Delta Recycling Corp., 377 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-14553), 2004 WL 
2445519; Amicus Brief, Harris v. Superior Court, 171 P.3d 545 (Cal. 2007) (No. S156555), 2008 
WL 6083951. 
 153. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 
(2005); Amicus Curiae Brief at 1, 8–9, Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (No. 06-4137); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1–2, De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2007) (No. 
06-3502), 2008 WL 5788178; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellants at 1–2, Senger v. City of Aberdeen, S.D., 466 F.3d 670 (8th Cir. 2006) (No. 
05-3803); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees 
at 2–3, Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-40370); Brief for the Secretary 
of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Megan McLaughlin at 1–2, 
McLaughlin v. Bos. Harbor Cruise Lines, Inc., 419 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1519), 2004 
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supported employees on one issue, and the employer on another.154 Prior to 
this time, the DOL had filed amicus briefs favoring an employer’s position 
only three times, and that was typically in response to court requests for the 
agency’s views.155 In contrast, the Bush DOL became an advocate for 
employers on its own initiative, using a bold, coordinated opinion letter 
and amicus brief strategy to narrow the scope of many FLSA provisions 
and, in some instances, to overturn prior DOL interpretations that had 
favored workers. The Bush DOL’s double-barreled opinion letter and 
amicus approach to limit FLSA protections is analyzed below in Part 
II.F.1. 
Whereas the Bush DOL favored business interests, the Obama DOL 
increased both direct enforcement efforts and amicus activity in FLSA 
cases. In just three years, the Obama administration submitted more FLSA 
amicus briefs—forty-three as of December 31, 2012—than the Bush 
administration submitted in eight years (twenty-three). The Obama 
administration filed amicus briefs favoring an employer’s position in two 
FLSA cases, at the request of the court.156  
                                                                                                                     
WL 5663334; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition for Panel 
Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1–2, Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 F.3d 274 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-1679, 02-1739), 2003 WL 23678322; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as 
Amicus Curiae at 1–2, O’Brien v. Town of Agawam, 350 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1685), 
2004 WL 5660200; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 7–
10, Bailey v. Gulf Coast Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-12379), 2001 WL 
34120388; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 9–11, Intracomm, Inc. v. Bajaj, 492 
F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1516), 2007 WL 1285885; Brief of the Secretary of Labor as 
Amicus in the Disposition of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 14–20, Mullins v. City of 
New York, 554 F. Supp. 2d 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (1: 04-cv-2979); Secretary of Labor’s Brief as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Dege v. 
Hutchinson Tech., Inc, No. 06-3754 (DWF/RLE), 2007 WL 3275111 (D. Minn. Nov. 2, 2007) (No. 
06-3754). 
 154. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 26–27, Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-35042, 02-35110), 2002 WL 32154024, at *26–27. 
 155. The first amicus on behalf of an employer, by the Truman administration in Vermilya-
Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948), argued that the FLSA did not apply to employees 
working on a United States military base outside the sovereign territory of the United States. See 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5–8, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 
(1940) (No. 22), 1948 WL 47165 at *5–8. In Robinson v. Barrow-Penn & Co., 194 Va. 632 (1953), 
the DOL’s brief argued that the Motor Carrier Act applied to the plaintiff truck drivers, precluding 
overtime pay under the FLSA. In Auer, upon Court request, the Clinton DOL submitted a brief that 
favored the employer given the facts at issue, but the underlying standard favored employees in 
other cases. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, 8–11, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 
452 (1997) (No. 95-897), 1996 WL 595843, at *1, *8–11. 
 156. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1, 17–18, Parth v. Pomona 
Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 630 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-55022) (arguing that only bona fide 
wage rate changes not designed to flout overtime requirements were permissible and that the rate 
change at issue satisfied that standard); Gallo v. Essex Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 10-10260-DPW, 
2011 WL 1155385, at *6 n.6, 7 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2011) (arguing that county sheriff’s office was 
immune from private FLSA action). 
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The zeal with which the Bush and Obama administrations used amicus 
briefs to advocate on behalf of certain favored groups—industry under 
President Bush and workers under President Obama—caused wild flip-
flops in the DOL’s position on certain issues during a short period of time. 
In the process, the DOL lost credibility with some courts, which refused to 
defer to certain inconsistent DOL positions from the Clinton (which 
favored employees), to the Bush (which changed some pro-employee 
positions to favor industry), to the Obama administrations (which tried to 
restore interpretations back to pro-employee, pre-Bush interpretations).157  
The Article returns to an analysis of the amicus activity of these 
administrations, and the chaos and confusion it caused on some issues, in 
Part II.F, infra. 
C.  Courts Are Likely to Rule Consistently with the DOL’s Amicus 
Position 
Lower courts are likely to rule consistently with the position in the 
DOL’s amicus brief, even if the court does not explicitly refer to a 
particular deference doctrine or to the DOL’s brief. The DOL’s amicus 
position prevailed at an overall rate of 66% (185 out of 281 cases), and lost 
34% of the time (96 out of 281 cases).158  
The agency’s position prevailed most frequently in federal district 
courts (76% of cases), then state courts (69%), then federal courts of 
appeal (65%) and the U.S. Supreme Court (64%). Table 2 shows the rate at 
which the agency’s position prevailed at each court level. 
Table 2:  Overall Rate that Court Favored DOL Amicus Position: By 
Court Level 
Court Level DOL 
Position 
Favored
DOL 
Position 
Failed
Total 
Cases 
U.S. Supreme Court 64% 23 36% 13 36 
Federal Circuit 65% 123 35% 67 190 
Federal District 76% 13 24% 4 17 
State Appellate 69% 25 31% 11 36 
Total 66% 186 34% 95 283 
                                                                                                                     
 157. See, e.g., Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 598–99 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(refusing to defer to DOL’s amicus position on compensability of donning and doffing protective 
clothing because of inconsistent interpretations among Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations 
and citing other courts of appeal “that have come together in spurning . . . ‘the gyrating agency 
letters on the subject.’”) (citations omitted). 
 158. This calculation was based on 281 cases for which both the DOL’s amicus position and 
the court ruling are available. It excludes those cases in which the court did not reach a decision 
(due to settlement or withdrawal of the case), cases still pending appeal, and cases for which the 
DOL amicus briefs are no longer available.  
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For more modern administrations for which complete amicus data sets 
are available, Table 3 shows the rate at which courts ruled in favor of the 
DOL’s amicus position:  
Table 3:  Rate at which Courts Ruled Consistently with DOL’s Amicus 
Position 
Administration 
Ruling 
Consistent with 
DOL Position
Ruling Against 
DOL Position Totals 
 Percent No. 
Cases
Percent No. 
Cases
Clinton 65% 13 35% 7 20 
Bush 74% 17 26% 6 23 
Obama 56% 19 44% 15 34 
Totals 64% 49 36% 28 77 
 
During the Clinton administration, when the DOL became a more 
frequent amicus filer, courts followed the position argued by the agency in 
65% of cases and against it in 35% of cases. The Bush administration was 
the most successful, with its position prevailing in 74% of cases and failing 
in 26%. Among the cases from the Obama administration which have been 
decided, courts sided with the DOL’s position in 56% of cases, and against 
it in 44%. 
The more important question for purposes of evaluating the agency 
amicus strategy is the impact of deference arguments on the outcome of the 
case. The next section analyzes the frequency with which the DOL has 
asserted deference principles in its amicus briefs and judicial responses to 
those arguments.  
D.  Deference Arguments Asserted in DOL Amicus Briefs 
For most of the FLSA’s history up until the Clinton administration, 
many DOL amicus curiae briefs noted—typically in a footnote—that the 
interpretations by the Wage and Hour Administrator should be given “great 
weight” under United States v. American Trucking Association,159 in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the interpretations of the Motor Carrier 
Act by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the DOL Wage and Hour 
Division “are entitled to great weight.”160 The DOL amicus briefs that cited 
American Trucking pointed out, however, that the Wage and Hour 
Administrator’s interpretations “are not, and do not purport to be, 
binding.”161 In Skidmore itself, the DOL’s brief simply provided a very 
                                                                                                                     
 159. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).  
 160. Id. at 549.  
 161. DOL Amicus Brief in Miller Hatcheries, Inc. v. I.A. Boyer, 131 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1942), 
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technical review of the FLSA and the agency’s prior positions on the issue 
of waiting time. Nowhere did the agency request that the Court defer, or 
even “respect,” the agency’s interpretations.  
After Skidmore, the DOL’s amicus briefs typically requested that the 
Wage and Hour Administrator’s position be given great weight or respect, 
but, with a few exceptions, did not request formal deference until the 
Clinton administration. In two early cases, the DOL argued that its 
interpretation of its own regulations should be entitled to controlling 
weight pursuant to Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., a pre-cursor to 
the Auer decision.162 The only pre-Clinton administration brief that 
asserted Chevron deference was Dybach v. State of Florida Department of 
Corrections,163  during the administration of President George H.W. Bush. 
The DOL’s brief argued that its regulation defining the professional 
exemption was entitled to deference under Chevron and that the plaintiff 
probation officer did not fall under the exemption.164 The court noted that 
it was ultimately responsible for interpreting the language of statutes and 
cited Chevron in deferring to the DOL’s application of the professional 
exemption.165  
The Clinton administration—during which Auer was decided—was the 
first to consistently request judicial deference to the agency’s position in its 
amicus briefs, arguing for some type of deference in twelve out of twenty-
two briefs.166 Only one brief requested Skidmore review alone, with ten 
briefs asserting more controlling deference under Auer, Chevron or a 
combination thereof. In the amicus brief submitted in Auer itself, the DOL 
asserted deference under Martin v. OSHRC,167 in which the Court, without 
citing Chevron, had granted substantial deference to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Review’s Commission interpretation of its own 
regulations.168  
The Bush DOL argued for deference—and typically controlling 
deference—in all but five of its twenty-three amicus briefs. The Bush DOL 
invoked Chevron seven times, Auer three times, and Chevron/Auer in 
                                                                                                                     
at 4 (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of Labor). 
 162. Bogash v. Baltimore Cigarette Serv., Inc., 193 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1951); Berlin v. Eimer 
& Amend, 66 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1946). 
 163. 942 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 164. Brief of U.S. Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Dybach, 942 F.2d 1561 (No. 90-3238) 
(on file with author). 
 165. 942 F.2d at 1565. 
 166. Brief of U.S. Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curie at 22–23 n.7, Gray v. Swanney-McDonald, 
Inc., 436 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1971) (Nos. 24476, 24504) (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S 134 
(1944); Brief of U.S. Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Baird v. Wagoner Trans. Co., 425 F.2d 407 
(6th Cir. 1970) (Nos. 19570-1) (citing Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1946); United 
States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940).  
 167. 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991). 
 168. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (No. 
95-897), 1996 WL 595843. 
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combination two times. It relied on Skidmore six times. The Obama DOL 
invoked Auer seven times, Chevron seven times, a Chevron/Auer 
combination three times, and Skidmore fourteen times.  
The breakdown of the type of deference asserted by the DOL in its 
amicus briefs, and the rate at which the court ruled consistently with the 
agency’s position in those cases, is reflected below in Table 4: 
Table 4: Type of Deference Argued in DOL Amicus Briefs (From 
Clinton to Obama)169 
Type of 
Deference 
Argued
Number 
of Briefs 
Rate at which courts ruled 
consistently with DOL 
position
  Number of 
Cases
Percent
Auer 17 8 47%
Chevron 14 11 79%
Chevron/Auer 7 3 43%
Skidmore 17 10 47%
 
In examining the overall success rate of formal deference arguments 
from Clinton through Obama, the most successful, not surprising given its 
controlling weight, has been Chevron (79% success rate), followed by Auer 
(47% success rate) and Skidmore (47%). But, as described in the next 
section, courts typically do not identify the deference regime on which they 
relying, if any, when ruling in favor of a position advocated by the DOL.  
In seventeen cases during the Clinton, Bush and Obama 
administrations, the DOL did not assert a particular deference doctrine in 
its amicus brief. These tended to be procedural issues rather than 
substantive interpretive issues. For example, in Bruer v. Jim’s Concrete of 
Brevard,170 the agency explained that a FLSA action filed in state court 
may be removed to federal court and a unanimous Court agreed. In Niland 
v. Delta Recycling Corp.,171 the DOL clarified that an employee who had 
accepted back pay as part of a DOL supervised audit of FLSA violations 
had waived his right to later sue for the same violation.172 Other briefs 
involved class certification or supplemental jurisdiction issues,173 a current 
                                                                                                                     
 169. This table excludes cases that are still pending or in which the court did not rule on the 
merits for other reasons (such as a settlement).   
 170. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Breuer v. Jim’s 
Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691 (2003) (No. 02-337), 2003 WL 1192669, at *3–4. 
 171. 377 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 172. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee 
Delta Recycling Corp. Supporting Affirmance of the District Court at 11–12, Niland v. Delta 
Recycling Corp., 377 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-14553), 2004 WL 2445519. 
 173. Class actions are not permitted under the FLSA. Instead, every employee who wants to 
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cutting-edge issue in FLSA litigation but one for which the agency lacks a 
long enforcement record.174 The only procedural brief that was not 
successful was the Bush DOL’s argument on behalf of an employer that an 
arbitrator in a FLSA case had manifestly disregarded the law by allowing a 
FLSA claim for back wages to proceed as an opt out class action rather 
than an opt in collective action required for FLSA court proceedings.175 
The Clinton amicus briefs that did not cite to some type of deference—all 
of which were successful—involved employee misclassification issues,176 
with one brief arguing that plaintiffs may proceed anonymously in FLSA 
actions.177  
E.  Court Response to Amicus Arguments 
Even prior to Skidmore, some courts expressed the need to respect the 
DOL’s amicus position in FLSA cases. The Supreme Court had 
pronounced a similar standard more than a century before Skidmore in 
Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby,178 stating: “In the construction of a doubtful 
and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were 
called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions 
into effect, is entitled to very great respect.”179 Some courts relied on this 
                                                                                                                     
join the case must affirmatively “opt in” to the action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). Two Obama 
administration amicus briefs argued that a FLSA collective action can proceed together with a state 
wage law class claim. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, 6–8, Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-
3029), 2009 WL 6504100; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1, 5–7, Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1884), 2011 WL 1246654. Another concerned the calculation of overtime wages 
on a representative basis in a FLSA collective action. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1, 10–11, Baden-Winterwood v. Life Time 
Fitness, Inc., 566 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 10-4269, 10-4361). 
 174. Unlike private right of action cases, in cases filed by the Secretary employees cannot opt 
in individually. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“The right provided by this subsection to bring an 
action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become a party plaintiff to 
any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor . . . .”). 
 175. See Long John Silver’s Rest., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2008); Brief of the 
Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8–9, Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc. 
v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-1259). 
 176. See Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1070–73 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding plaintiffs in FLSA case may proceed anonymously); Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 
633 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding grower was joint employer of farm workers); Antenor v. D&S Farms, 
88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); Cara-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d 1500 (11th 
Cir. 1993) (holding employees were engaged in seasonal agricultural work and were therefore 
protected by the FLSA). 
 177. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1–3, Does I thru XXIII v. 
Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-16713). 
 178. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827). 
 179. Id. at 210.  
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concept in pre-Skidmore FLSA cases.180 For example, in Umthun v. Day & 
Zimmerman181—decided one month before Skidmore—the Iowa Supreme 
Court wrote: “This construction of the statute by the administrative 
department charged with its enforcement, although not binding on us, 
should be given our respectful consideration.”182 After Skidmore, a handful 
of courts explicitly discussed the need to give “respect” or “great weight” 
to the agency’s interpretations.183 But just a year after Skidmore, the 
Supreme Court refused to defer to the DOL’s position in Jewell Ridge Coal 
Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America.184 
Jewell Ridge concerned the compensability of the time that coal miners 
spent in underground travel from mine to mine.185 In 1940, in response to 
various wage investigations by the DOL, coal mining companies and 
unions jointly sent a letter to the Wage and Hour Administrator arguing 
that such travel time should not be compensated.186 They pleaded that 
“such a change ‘would create so much confusion in the bituminous 
industry as to result in complete chaos, and would probably result in a 
complete stoppage of work at practically all of the coal mines in the United 
States.’”187 In response, the DOL issued an opinion letter blessing the 
practice of excluding travel time as the custom and practice in coal mining 
collective bargaining agreements.188  
In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected the DOL’s interpretation as 
“legally untenable” and therefore “lack[ing] the usual respect to be 
accorded the Administrator’s rulings, interpretations and opinions” under 
Skidmore.189 The Court found that the miners’ underground travel satisfied 
the test for “work time” under the FLSA.190 The Court based its rejection 
of the DOL’s acceptance of the industry-union compromise on the 
                                                                                                                     
 180. See., e.g., Missel v. Overnight Motor Transp. Co., 126 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1942) (relying on 
United States v. American Trucking Ass’n); Bumpus v. Continental Baking Co., 124 F.2d 549, 552 
(6th Cir. 1941) (citing Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby). 
 181. 16 N.W.2d 258 (Iowa 1944). 
 182. Id. at 259 (citation omitted).  
 183. See Fred Wolferman, Inc. v. Gustafson, 169 F.2d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1948); Anderson v. 
Manhattan Lighterage Corp., 148 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1945) (granting Skidmore-like deference 
without citing Skidmore). 
 184. 325 U.S. 161, 169 (1945). 
 185. Id. at 162. 
 186. Id. at 183. 
 187. Id. at 183–85 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (describing letter to Administrator by coal 
companies and unions). 
 188. See id. at 187–88 (citing 3 Wage and Hour Rep. 332, 333). The Administrator’s Letter 
stated that “working time on a ‘face to face’ basis in the bituminous coal mining industry would not 
be unreasonable.” Id. 
 189. Id. at 169 (majority opinion). 
 190. Id. at 166. Specifically, the travel time in the mines 1) involved physical or mental 
exertion; 2) that was controlled or required by the employer; and 3) was pursued necessarily and 
primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business. See id. at 163–66. 
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remedial purpose of the statute, stating that the FLSA was not designed to 
“allow an employer to claim all of an employee’s time while compensating 
him only for a part of it. Congress intended, instead, to achieve a uniform 
national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment 
engaged in by employees covered by the Act.”191 
Justice Robert Jackson dissented, blasting the majority’s refusal to defer 
to the DOL. After describing the Administrator’s opinion letter, he stated: 
“We have admonished lower courts that they must give heed to these 
interpretations. The District Court in this case did so, only to find them 
brushed aside here as of no importance.”192 
Thus, since the New Deal, the Court has sent mixed signals about the 
degree of weight to give to the DOL’s amicus positions. Perhaps given this 
confusion, most courts simply do not address deference principles at all. In 
the vast majority of the cases in this study, courts did not cite or discuss a 
deference framework, even when they ruled consistently with the DOL’s 
position. Some courts mentioned the DOL’s amicus brief or characterized 
it as “quite informative” in reaching a decision, but did not discuss 
deference principles.193 
Only nineteen cases in the database deferred to the DOL’s amicus 
position with a citation to controlling deference under Auer or Chevron. 
Chevron has been cited as a reason for deferring to the DOL’s 
interpretation seven times.194 Since Auer was decided, twelve cases have 
cited or relied on it in deferring to the DOL’s interpretation.195 In Long 
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, the Court cited both Chevron and Auer 
in unanimously deferring to the DOL’s informal interpretations that were 
                                                                                                                     
 191. Id. at 167 (quoting Tennessee Coal Co.v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590, 602 (1944) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 192. Id. at 188 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 193. See, e.g., Schmidtke v. Conesa, 141 F.2d 634, 635–36 (1st Cir. 1944) (referring to amicus 
brief in reaching decision); Tidewater Optical Co. v. Wittkamp, 19 S.E.2d 897, 899 (Va. 1942) 
(referring to DOL amicus brief as “quite informative” about purpose of the FLSA). William 
Eskridge has characterized cases in which courts follow the agency but do not identify a deference 
framework as “consultative deference.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1473–74 (2008). 
 194. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171–74 (2007); Buckner 
v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (11th Cir. 2007); Senger v. City of 
Aberdeen, 466 F.3d 670, 672–74 (8th Cir. 2006); Kosakow v. New Rochelle Med. Assocs., P.C., 
274 F.3d 706 (2nd Cir. 2001); see also Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1565 
(11th Cir. 1991) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984)). 
 195. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007); Fast v. 
Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 638 F.3d 872, 878–79 (8th Cir. 2011); Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 
587, 590 (11th Cir. 2011); Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217, 1225 (11th 
Cir. 2010); In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2010); Intracomm, Inc v. 
Bajaj, 492 F.3d 285, 293 (4th Cir. 2007); Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2006); 
Takacs v. Hahn Auto. Corp., 246 F.3d 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2001); Yourman v. Giuliani, 229 F.3d 
124, 128 (2d Cir. 2000).  
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developed during pending litigation.196 Twelve cases cited the “great 
weight” standard from Skidmore, Christensen, or Mead.197 
Courts did not identify a deference principle in the vast majority (more 
than 80%) of the cases in which they ruled consistently with the DOL’s 
amicus position. Given that courts often do not refer to the agency’s 
amicus brief or pinpoint a controlling deference framework, it is difficult to 
conclude with any certainty whether judges are relying on, or even reading, 
agency amicus briefs or are simply convinced by one of the parties. Prior 
surveys of federal judges, however, have indicated that judges find amicus 
briefs by government agencies to be “moderately” or “very helpful” in 
resolving disputes.198 Administrative law scholars also have concluded 
based on empirical analysis that government amicus curiae briefs have an 
impact on the Supreme Court.199 
When President Bush took over the DOL, Auer empowered the agency 
to exploit amicus arguments to narrow the FLSA’s protections and expand 
its exemptions. Eight years later, the Obama DOL used amicus briefs to 
reinvigorate FLSA enforcement on behalf of workers. The next section 
explains how the Bush and Obama DOLs used amicus strategies more 
aggressively than any administration since Roosevelt to accomplish their 
policy priorities. The juxtaposition of these two administrations shows the 
exceptional power of the agency amicus strategy of policy making in the 
courts. In the long run, however, political flip-flops from administration to 
administration in the enforcement of the FLSA will harm the presumption 
that the agency is operating in good faith, and with special technical 
expertise, to execute Congress’s remedial intent when it passed the FLSA.  
                                                                                                                     
 196. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171–74.  
 197. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335–36 
(2011); Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., 669 F.3d 428, 428–39 (4th Cir. 2012); Perez v. Mountaire 
Farms, Inc. 650 F.3d 350, 371 (4th Cir. 2011); Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 
132, 149 (2d Cir. 2008); McLaughlin v. Boston Harbor Cruise Lines, Inc., 419 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 
2005); Anderson v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1354–55 (M.D. Ala. 2009); see also 
Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 F.3d 274, 286 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001)). 
 198. One survey of federal judges found that “[a]micus curiae briefs offered by governmental 
entities were favored at all levels of the federal bench.” Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical 
Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 
27 REV. LITIG. 669, 697 (2008). Three Supreme Court respondents found agency amicus briefs to be 
“very helpful to the Court.” Id. In addition, “the Circuit and District Court respondents ranked the 
government as the most helpful amicus curiae, with 96.3% of Circuit Court and 86.4% of District 
Court respondents indicating that the government is either moderately or very helpful.” Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 199. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 828–30. 
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F.  Bush and Obama Use Deference Frameworks to Establish FLSA 
Policy in the Courts 
1.  Bush Used a Coordinated Opinion Letter and Amicus Strategy to 
Undermine FLSA Coverage 
Armed with the power of Auer, although somewhat tempered by 
Christensen and Mead, President George W. Bush came to office and 
appointed former management-side litigators to lead the DOL’s Office of 
Solicitor and Wage and Hour Division. President Bush first appointed 
Eugene Scalia to be the Solicitor of Labor through a recess appointment, 
but he was not confirmed due to controversy surrounding his 
nomination.200 Howard Radzely, a former clerk to Justice Scalia who spent 
his career representing employers, then took the helm.201 As historian 
Nelson Lichtenstein wrote: “The Scalia nomination was characteristic of 
Bush’s approach to the nation’s labor standards regime: put an ideological 
fox in the regulatory henhouse, and then watch the fireworks explode.”202 
Legal scholar Susan Bisom-Rapp writes that the Bush DOL “was a model 
of industry capture.”203  
Early in the Bush administration, the DOL used formal rulemaking to 
amend the regulations regarding the professional, executive, and 
administrative exemptions to overtime pay.204 Its proposed revisions were 
subjected to intense criticism, prompting more than 75,000 public 
comments and a threat from Congress “to deny funding for any DOL 
action that would exempt employees currently eligible for overtime 
pay.”205 In the end, the administration was forced to compromise or 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Audrey Hudson, Justice’s Son Resigns from Labor Position, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, 
at A5 (noting that Scalia was recess-appointed Solicitor of Labor in January 2001, named Acting 
Solicitor in November 2002 when the recess appointment expired, and resigned in January 2003 
before his confirmation hearing). 
 201. 149 CONG. REC. S16214 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (noting the Senate’s confirmation of 
Howard Radzely); see also Nomination of Howard M. Radzely, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor,& Pensions, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (2003) (statement of Sen. Gregg).  
 202. Nelson Lichtenstein, Ideology and Interest on the Social Policy Home Front, in THE 
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH: A FIRST HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT 169, 177 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 
2010). 
 203. Susan Bisom-Rapp, What We Learn in Troubled Times: Deregulation and Safe Work in 
the New Economy, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1197, 1202 (2009). Professor Bison-Rapp was referring to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a division of the DOL. Id. (“The agency withdrew 
numerous proposed regulations, delayed others, modified warnings based on industry pressure, and 
emasculated its cooperative programming.”). 
 204. See, e.g., Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, 
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,559, 15,560 (proposed Mar. 
31, 2003) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541). 
 205. Regan C. Rowan, Comment, Solving the Bluish Collar Problem: An Analysis of the 
DOL’s Modernization of the Exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 119, 122 n.23 (2004) (describing controversy over proposed amendments); see also William J. 
Kilberg & Jason C. Schwartz, Saga of Reform: Regulation of Worker Overtime, 8 BRIEFLY 4, 18 
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abandon many of its proposals in the final promulgated regulations.206  
In the judicial arena, the Bush administration used amicus briefs to limit 
the reach of worker protection statutes in a more subtle manner that 
avoided public scrutiny and compromises. The Bush DOL utilized a 
coordinated opinion letter and amicus strategy that was bolder and 
different from prior administrations in at least three ways. First, in the 
midst of litigation pending in the federal courts, the Wage and Hour 
Administrator—a political appointee—issued opinion letters requested by 
industry trade groups of which the defendants in the pending FLSA 
litigation were members. These opinion letters were sometimes issued on 
the heels of a court judgment that had favored employees. Second, the new 
opinion letters often withdrew prior opinion letters—sometimes spanning 
multiple prior administrations—and set forth in great detail a new, 
inconsistent interpretation.207 Third, the new interpretation typically 
favored industry rather than workers, running contrary to long-standing 
FLSA doctrine that the exemptions must be narrowly construed against 
employers208 and that the Act must be construed liberally to accomplish its 
remedial purpose.209 
Even more troubling, the Bush DOL then appeared as an amicus in 
private litigation matters and urged the court to grant “great deference” to 
the new opinion letter and reverse prior court rulings that had favored 
                                                                                                                     
(2004), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/sept04-sagareformregof 
overtimekilbergschwartz.pdf (“The proposed changes drew intense criticism and were portrayed as 
an effort by business groups and their Republican allies to deprive middle and lower income 
Americans of their overtime payments—to make them work harder for less money.”). 
 206. See Kilberg & Schwartz, supra note 205, at 20–29 (describing how “the final rule is a 
compromise product”). 
 207. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 22–23 app. A, Alvarez v. 
IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-35042, 02-35110) (withdrawing three earlier 
opinion letters and requesting Skidmore deference for new, contradictory opinion letter); Dougherty 
v. Teva Pharm. USA, 2007 WL 1165068 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007) (DOL invoked Chevron deference 
for amicus interpretation of regulation which contradicted 1994 opinion letter); Brief of the 
Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the August 
30, 2006 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary 
Judgment at 10–13, Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 05-2336, 2007 WL 1165068 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 9, 2007) (No. 05-02336) (invoking Chevron deference for amicus interpretation of 
regulation which contradicted 1994 opinion letter). 
 208. Employers bear the burden of proving the applicability of an exemption. See Corning 
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1974). 
 209. See A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (“To extend an exemption to 
other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative 
process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.”); Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & 
Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (stating that the FLSA “has been construed liberally to apply to 
the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction”); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 
(1997) (“FLSA exemptions are to be ‘narrowly construed against . . . employers’ and are to be 
withheld except as to persons ‘plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.’”) (quoting 
Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)). 
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employees.210 The DOL either filed an amicus at the district court level 
supporting the employer’s request for reconsideration in light of the new 
opinion letter or participated as an amicus in the court of appeals. The 
subsections below provide examples of the Bush DOL’s strategy of using 
opinion letters, together with amicus filings, to support regulated interests 
in narrowing the coverage of the FLSA. 
a.  Alvarez v. IBP, Inc. 
Consider Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.,211 an overtime case against a 
meatpacking company.212 This well-known case ultimately made its way to 
the Supreme Court, which held that the time that meatpacking employees 
spent walking between the location where they don and doff protective 
gear to their work stations should be included in the calculation of hours 
worked under the FLSA.213 The DOL’s amicus activity in this case at the 
lower court level, however, is less well known and provides the earliest 
example of the Bush DOL using an opinion letter and amicus brief, along 
with deference arguments, in an attempt to narrow FLSA coverage.  
On September 14, 2001, the district court held that IBP had willfully 
violated the FLSA by not including the time that workers spent donning 
and doffing protective gear and walking to their work stations.214 The court 
also rejected IBP’s defense that the union workers at the plant were not 
entitled to compensation for donning and doffing under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(o), which provides that an employer does not have to pay for time 
spent “changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each work 
day” if such time is excluded from working time “by the express terms of 
or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining 
agreement.”215 Eight months after the court ruled against IBP, the DOL 
issued an opinion letter to the American Meat Institute,216 of which IBP 
was a member, that withdrew three prior DOL opinion letters from 1997, 
1998, and 2001 that had consistently found that donning and doffing time 
                                                                                                                     
 210. Examples include the DOL’s amicus briefs in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., Geig v. DDR, Inc. and 
in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, described in the following subsections.   
 211. No. CT–98–5005–RHW, 2001 WL 34897841 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2001). 
 212. Id. at *1. 
 213. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005). 
 214. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., No. CT–98–5005–RHW, 2001 WL 34897841, at *10 (E.D. Wash. 
Sept. 14, 2001). 
 215. Id. at *2 n.2. The collective bargaining agreements at the plant had a provision for clothes 
changing time in 1976 and again for the years 1979–1982, but the provision had been eliminated in 
1982. Id. at *15. 
 216. According to its own brief in Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., the AMI “is the nation’s oldest 
and largest trade association representing packers and processors of beef, pork, lamb, veal, turkey 
and processed meat products.” Brief of the National Chicken Council and American Meat Institute 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., No. 04-66 (1st Cir. Aug. 
1, 2005), 2005 WL 1841384, at *2. 
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is compensable time that may not be waived for union workers in a 
collective bargaining agreement.217  
In the appeal of Alvarez to the Ninth Circuit, the DOL supported the 
employees on the compensability of donning and doffing time. 
Nevertheless, this pro-employee position was undermined by the DOL’s 
argument that the court should defer to its new opinion letter—issued after 
the district court’s adverse ruling against the employer—that applied 
§ 203(o) to the clothes-changing and washing activities of union 
employees in the meatpacking industry.218 In other words, the DOL argued 
that the time may be compensable for nonunion workers, but not for the 
union workers in the case before the court. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected the DOL’s “new, inconsistent interpretation,”219 finding 
that it directly conflicted with the 1997 opinion letter and was not entitled 
to deference because of that inconsistency.220 The Supreme Court did not 
consider the § 203(o) issue.  
b.  Gieg v. DDR, Inc. 
The Bush DOL was more successful in achieving a pro-business victory 
with an amicus strategy in Gieg v. DDR, Inc.,221 which consolidated three 
cases in which district courts had held that finance and insurance managers 
of retail automobile dealerships were entitled to overtime pay under the 
FLSA.222 After the employees won their motions for summary judgment in 
district court (indeed, only three days after the plaintiff won in Gieg), the 
DOL issued an opinion letter to the National Automobile Dealers 
Association (NADA) stating that a finance and insurance salesperson 
employed by a retail automobile dealership was exempt from overtime.223 
                                                                                                                     
 217. Letter from Tammy D. McCutchen, Administrator of the DOL Wage and Hour Division 
to Samuel D. Walker, counsel for the American Meat Institute (June 6, 2002) (attached as 
Addendum A to the DOL’s amicus brief). Under § 203(o), the employer does not have to pay for 
time spent “changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday” if such time is 
excluded from working time “by the express terms [of] or by custom or practice under a bona fide 
collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. 
 218. Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 22, Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 
(9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-35042 and 02-35110), 2002 WL 32154024.  
 219. Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894, 905–06 n.9. 
 220. Id. (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (“[a]n agency 
interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier interpretation is 
entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.” (alteration in 
original)). 
 221. 407 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 222. Id. at 1041. The consolidated cases consisted of Wickersham v. Haselwood Buick-Pontiac 
Co., No. C01-5557FDB, 2002 WL 32152269 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2002); Geig v. Haselwood 
Buick-Pontiac Co., No. Civ. 98-1563-HA, 2003 WL 21087602 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2003); and 
Chaloupka v. SLT/TAG Inc., No. Civ. 02-743-HU, Civ. 02-1053-HU, 2003 WL 23540259 (D. Or. 
July 14, 2003). 
 223. Opinion Letter from Tammy D. McCutchen, Wage and Hour Administrator to Douglas I. 
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The DOL then filed amicus briefs supporting the employers on a motion 
for reconsideration in the district courts and on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 
Other federal district courts had declined to follow the new opinion letter 
in unrelated cases involving the same legal issue,224 with one judge finding 
that the letter was “inconsistent with, and in fact, ignore[d], regulations” 
concerning the exemption.225 The court found that the opinion letter lacked 
the power to persuade because it had been solicited “by those associated 
with defendants.”226 
In its amicus brief in Gieg in the Ninth Circuit, the DOL set forth the 
Skidmore framework, under which agency interpretations are entitled to 
respect, but then cited a Ninth Circuit case to argue that the court should 
give the new opinion letter “great deference,”227 which is more akin to the 
Chevron standard. Although the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly address the 
deference issue, it ruled consistently with the DOL’s position and reversed 
the decisions that had favored the employees.228 The Bush DOL had 
therefore succeeded in using its opinion letter and amicus advocacy to 
change a pro-employee policy to one that favored the automobile dealer 
industry. 
c.  Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke 
The Bush DOL also used an amicus strategy to support pro-employer 
positions on the question of whether in-home companionship workers who 
work for home healthcare companies were entitled to overtime, with an 
ultimate victory in the U.S. Supreme Court in Long Island Care at Home, 
Ltd. v. Coke.229 Other scholars have described Long Island Care at Home 
as an example of the Court’s proper regard for the APA and appropriate 
application of Chevron.230 A closer examination of the behind-the-scenes 
opinion letter, advisory memorandum, and amicus litigation strategy used 
by the agency shows something more politically charged at work.  
                                                                                                                     
Greenhas, NADA (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2003/ 
2003_03_17_1_FLSA.pdf. 
 224. Cases declining to follow the new opinion letter include Wickersham, Gieg, and 
Chaloupka. 
 225. Chaloupka, 2003 WL 23540259, at *3. 
 226. See id. at *3–4. 
 227. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 15, Gieg v. DDR, Inc., 407 F.3d 
1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-35707 and 03-36619). The DOL cited Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537, 
1543 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1081 (1994), which afforded “great deference” to a 
decades-old opinion letters from 1961, 1968, and 1973 that stated that employers must pay 
employees on regular paydays and cannot hold wages and “make up the difference at the end of the 
month.” 
 228. Gieg, 407 F.3d 138, 1053. 
 229. 551 U.S. 158 (2007). 
 230. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 6, at 721 (stating that “Long Island Care at Home is highly 
reminiscent of the approach that was taken by the Court in pre-Chevron cases during the formative 
years of the APA”).  
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The dispute centered on a 1974 amendment to the FLSA to expand 
coverage to “domestic service workers.”231 Congress exempted from 
domestic service coverage only those engaged in casual home activities, 
such as babysitting or “companionship services,” as “defined and 
delimited” by the DOL.232 Shortly thereafter, the DOL engaged in notice-
and-comment rulemaking to define the scope of the new provision.233 The 
promulgated regulations had an apparent internal inconsistency. One 
regulation, entitled “General Regulations” defined exempt domestic 
service workers as those employed “in or about a private home . . . of the 
person by whom he or she is employed.”234 The General Regulation was 
passed through notice-and-comment rulemaking and provided that only 
those workers employed directly by the homeowner—not a third party 
company—were exempt from overtime.235 Another interpretive regulation, 
labeled “Third Party Employment” and not passed through rulemaking, 
stated that the exemption included companionship workers who “are 
employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household 
using their services.”236 This “third-party regulation” suggested that home 
health workers, regardless of the employer, are not entitled to overtime.237 
Despite this regulatory inconsistency, the DOL had long interpreted 
these provisions to mean that home health workers employed by third-party 
businesses were entitled to overtime pay.238 The DOL had considered 
making a change to the third-party regulation on three occasions over a 
fifteen-year period, but had not ultimately changed the regulation nor 
changed its interpretation that home health care workers working for 
private companies were protected by the FLSA.239  
The Bush administration modified the DOL’s long-standing policy in 
favor of coverage to one that exempted home healthcare workers employed 
                                                                                                                     
 231. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 7(b)(1), (2), 88 
Stat. 55, 62 (adding home health care workers to minimum wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206(f), and overtime, 
id. § 207(l) standards).  
 232. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2006). 
 233. Extension to Domestic Service Employees, 40 Fed. Reg. 7404 (Feb. 20, 1975) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 516, 552). 
 234. 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (1975). 
 235. See id. 
 236. Id. § 552.109(a). 
 237. See id. 
 238. See D. Sweeney, DOL Opinion Letter, Home Health Aides/Companionship Exemption, 
6A LRR, Wages and Hours Manual 99:8205 (Jan. 6, 1999), available at 1999 WL 1002349 
(explaining that employees of third-party employer qualify for the exemption only if they are also 
jointly employed “by the family or household using their services”); Application of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to Domestic Service, 58 Fed. Reg. 69,311 (proposed Dec. 30, 1993) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 552). 
 239. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 163–64 (2007) (citing 58 Fed. 
Reg. 69,310-69,312 (1993); 60 Fed. Reg. 46,798 (Sept. 8, 1995); 66 Fed. Reg. 5481, 5485 (Jan. 19, 
2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 16,668 (Apr. 8, 2002). 
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by third parties from the FLSA. In three circuit court cases, the DOL 
submitted amicus briefs arguing that the interpretive third-party regulation, 
together with its new opinion letter and amicus interpretation, were entitled 
to Chevron deference.240 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits sided with the 
agency’s position.241 The Second Circuit, however, held that only the 
General Regulation, under which the workers were entitled to overtime, 
was entitled to deference under Chevron because it was passed through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.242  The Second Circuit, applying 
Skidmore to the interpretive regulation, concluded that it was 
“unpersuasive in the context of the entire statutory and regulatory 
scheme.”243 The court found that the interpretive regulation contradicted 
Congress’s purpose to expand coverage to domestic service employees,244 
and that it was “jarringly inconsistent” with other contemporaneous DOL 
regulations under which home health workers were entitled to overtime.245 
The court noted that the DOL had never adequately explained what 
accounted for the agency’s “about-face” in its position.”246  
In response to the Second Circuit’s ruling, and after the employer had 
sought certiorari in the Supreme Court, the DOL drafted an informal, 
internal “Wage and Hour Advisory Memorandum” defending its new pro-
industry position.247 The Solicitor General then requested that the Supreme 
Court vacate the Second Circuit’s decision and remand the case so the 
circuit court could consider the Advisory Memorandum.248 The Second 
Circuit remained unconvinced and again held the interpretive regulation 
unenforceable.249  
The Supreme Court then granted the employer’s petition for 
certiorari,250 which was supported by the DOL as amicus.251 A unanimous 
                                                                                                                     
 240. Brief for the Secretary Of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 
8, Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-11032-EE); 
Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 6, Cook 
v. Hays, 212 F. App’x 295 (5th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-30856); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as 
Amicus Curiae at 12–15, Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(No. 03-7666), 2003 WL 24089825 at *14. 
 241. See Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Cook v. Hays, 212 F. App’x 295, 296–97 (5th Cir. 2006). The Eleventh Circuit ruled after the 
Supreme Court decided Long Island Care at Home. 
 242. 376 F.3d 118, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 243. Id. at 122. 
 244. Id. at 133. 
 245. Id. at 133–34. 
 246. Id. at 134. 
 247. See Wage and Hour Advisory Memorandum No. 2005-1 (Dec. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/FieldBulletins/AdvisoryMemoranda2005.pdf. 
 248. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 164 (2007). 
 249. Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d 48, 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
 250. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 031. 
 251. Brief of Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1, Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 
42
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/4
2013] REGULATION BY AMICUS 1265 
 
Court afforded Chevron deference to the interpretive regulation and held 
that home health care workers employed by third parties were exempt from 
the FLSA.252 It did not bother the Court that the agency’s interpretation 
was “circuitous and inconsistent,” crafted during pending litigation, and 
created a new exemption for workers whom the DOL had considered 
entitled to overtime for more than a decade.253 Citing Auer, the Court 
stated: “Where, as here, an agency’s course of action indicates that the 
interpretation of its own regulation reflects its considered views . . . we 
have accepted that interpretation as the agency’s own, even if the agency 
set those views forth in a legal brief.”254  
After Long Island Care at Home, the DOL publicly proclaimed amicus 
briefs as “a very powerful tool” to influence court interpretations.255  The 
former Wage and Hour Administrator for the Bush administration 
suggested that Long Island Care at Home meant that opinion letters and 
other informal agency guidance are entitled to more than Skidmore 
deference, stating: “This is a stronger statement of what [Skidmore] 
deference means in the context of agency guidance, like an opinion 
letter. . . The [C]ourt is clear that courts should give deference so long as it 
is not a surprise.”256 
As seen in these cases, the Bush DOL exploited informal agency 
interpretations, such as opinion letters and amicus briefs, to change certain 
FLSA interpretations from pro-employee to pro-employer positions, 
asserting Chevron or Auer deference for the new, inconsistent 
interpretation. The Bush administration used similar amicus strategies to 
urge pro-industry interpretations for other worker protection statues. For 
example, the DOL appeared as an amicus supporting corporations in 
arguing that employees of subsidiaries of publicly traded companies were 
not protected by the whistleblower provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.257 The DOL argued that employers could require employees to waive 
                                                                                                                     
267 F. Supp. 2d 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03-7666), 2003 WL 24089825, at *1. 
 252. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d at 50, 52 (per curiam). 
 253. Triplett, supra note 103. 
 254. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
 255. Michael R. Triplett, DOL Focus on Amicus Briefs, Opinion Letters Pays Off With 
Increased Deference by Courts, 217 Daily Lab. Rep. Online (BNA) B-1 (Nov. 9, 2007) (reporting 
comments by Paul L. Frieden, head of the appellate litigation department of the DOL Solicitor’s 
Office at the American Bar Association’s Labor and Employment Section meeting on November 8, 
2007). 
 256. Michael R. Triplett, Justices Rule 9-0 that Home Health Workers Employed by Third 
Parties Not Owed Overtime, 112 Daily Lab. Rep. Online (BNA) AA-1 (June 12, 2007). 
 257. See, e.g., Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae, In re Ambrose v. U.S. Foodservice 
Inc., No. 06-096, 2007 WL 7139500 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor SAROX Sept. 28, 2007) (arguing that 
employee of subsidiary of publicly traded company was not covered by SOX whistleblower 
provision); Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae, In re Ede v. Swatch Group, No. 05-053, 
2007 WL 7143175 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor SAROX, June 27, 2007) (arguing that SOX does not apply 
to workers exclusively located outside the United States).  
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their rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act.258 The DOL also 
submitted amicus briefs in various circuits supporting industry positions 
that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted 
attempts by local and state governments to require employers to provide 
health insurance benefits to employees.259 Outside of the DOL, the Food 
and Drug Administration during the Bush administration used an amicus 
approach to change tort law to provide drug and device manufacturers with 
greater preemption protection,260 culminating in a victory in Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc.261  
At the same time that the Bush DOL tried to narrow the coverage of 
worker protection statutes through its amicus advocacy, its affirmative 
FLSA enforcement efforts dropped. In the period from 1997 to 2007, the 
number of “enforcement actions decreased by more than a third, from 
approximately 47,000 actions in 1997 to just under 30,000 in 2007.”262 
Most of these cases were initiated by worker complaints rather than 
                                                                                                                     
 258. See, e.g., Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee’s 
Petition for Rehearing en banc at *2, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(No. 04-1525) , 2005 WL 6718391at *2–3 (arguing that DOL regulation stating “[e]mployees 
cannot waive, nor may employer induce employees to waive, their rights under the FMLA” applies 
only to prospective waiver of rights, not settlement of private claims); Brief of Dep’t of Labor as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing en 
banc at 1, Harrell v. U.S. Postal Service, 445 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2006) (No. 03-4204) (arguing that 
employers have the right under the FMLA to apply additional return to work provisions in a 
collective bargaining agreement); Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the Aug. 30, 2006 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment at 10, Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, No. 
05-2336, 2007 WL 1165068 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 9, 2007) (arguing that DOL’s interpretation of the 
FMLA non-waiver provision should be afforded Chevron deference). The Bush DOL also argued 
for a narrow interpretation of the term “worksite” under the FMLA regulations, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.111(a)(3)—under which employers are covered if they employ at least fifty employees within 
seventy-five miles of an employee’s worksite—so that the employee in question would not be 
covered by the FMLA after she was injured in a car accident. Brief of Dep’t of Labor as Amicus 
Curiae, Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 391 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1156), 
2003 WL 24213885, at *2–5. 
 259. See, e.g., Brief of the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and 
Requesting Affirmance at 7–13, Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 
2007) (Nos. 06-1840, 06-1901), 2006 WL 3336531, at *7–13.  
 260. Two attorneys examined the Food and Drug Administration’s amicus strategy during the 
Bush administration to change tort law to provide drug and device manufacturers with greater 
preemption protection. See Mark C. Levy & Gregory J. Wartman, Amicus Curiae Efforts to Reform 
Product Liability at the Food and Drug Administration: FDA’s Influence on Federal Preemption of 
Class III Medical Devices and Pharmaceuticals, 60 FOOD &DRUG L.J. 495 (2005).  
 261. 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that state law tort claims against a medical device 
manufacturer were preempted by federal law). 
 262. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,  GAO-08-962T, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: 
BETTER USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND CONSISTENT REPORTING COULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE 5 
(2008). 
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proactive agency enforcement.263 The number of enforcement actions 
initiated by the agency fell by 45% over the same ten-year period, “from 
approximately 13,000 in 1997 to approximately 7000 in 2007.”264  
2.  The Obama DOL Increased the Use of Amicus Briefs as an 
Enforcement Approach 
The Obama DOL made the revival of FLSA enforcement a top priority. 
For example, the DOL “hired about 300 additional investigators to probe 
wage theft complaints.”265 It signed agreements with states and the Internal 
Revenue Service to share information “to crack down on businesses that 
cheat workers out of their wages.”266 In fiscal year 2011, the Wage and 
Hour Division collected nearly $225 million in back wages, which was 
“the largest amount collected in a single fiscal year in the Division’s 
history.”267 
A central part of the Obama DOL’s efforts to reinvigorate FLSA 
enforcement on behalf of misclassified and low-wage workers included the 
filing of amicus briefs. Through its first term (ending December 31, 2012), 
the Obama administration had submitted forty-three amicus briefs in FLSA 
cases. It was equally, if not more, active in filing amicus briefs in cases 
involving ERISA and other labor statutes enforced by the DOL.268  
During its first term, the Obama DOL’s amicus efforts in FLSA cases 
were focused on several recurrent issues. First, the DOL argued that oral 
complaints of wage violations to an employer are protected by the FLSA’s 
anti-retaliation provisions under a long-standing agency position. These 
arguments ultimately prevailed in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 
Plastics Corp.269 Second, the DOL filed amicus briefs in cases involving 
low-wage and immigrant workers. For example, in Josendis v. Wall to 
Wall Residence Repairs, Inc.,270 the DOL submitted an amicus brief 
arguing that undocumented workers are entitled to the FLSA’s 
                                                                                                                     
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Sam Hananel, Labor Dept. Expands Enforcement of Wage Violations, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/AP1a153b15fbd44922854b2aff6f272223.html. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Examining Regulatory and Enforcement Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the 
Workforce, 112th Cong. 8, 11 (2011) (Testimony of Nancy J. Leppink, Deputy Wage and Hour 
Administrator, U.S. Dep’t of Labor), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg70971/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg70971.pdf. 
 268. During its first term, the Obama DOL filed more than fifty amicus briefs in ERISA cases, 
which are posted on the Office of the Solicitor website. See also Robert Steyer, Critics Claim DOL 
Using Amicus Briefs to Steer by Pension Roadblocks, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 25, 2011, 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20110725/PRINTSUB/110729948.  
 269. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 270. 662 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2011). 
45
Eisenberg: Regulation by <i>Amicus</i>:The Department of Labor’s Policy Maki
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1268 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
protections.271 In Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Service, Inc.,272 the 
agency argued that landscapers who handled tools and materials that 
traveled in interstate commerce were protected by the FLSA.273 The DOL 
has also weighed in on the proper calculation of minimum wages and 
overtime for tipped employees274 and migrant workers.275 Other cases 
involved the issue of the compensability of donning and doffing time for 
poultry workers.276  
Even though the Obama DOL was a much more active amicus filer, it 
used a slightly more conservative approach to deference arguments in 
amicus briefs. The Obama DOL typically reserved the assertion of Chevron 
for those interpretations that had been venerable agency interpretations set 
forth in multiple opinion letters277—issued well before the pending 
litigation—or long-standing enforcement positions. For example, in Kasten 
and other cases involving the question of whether oral complaints of wage 
violations to an employer are protected by the FLSA’s anti-retaliation 
provisions, the DOL argued that its longstanding interpretation that such 
complaints are covered was entitled to Chevron deference.278 Citing 
Kasten, the DOL urged deference for its view that a collective action under 
the FLSA, in which plaintiffs must “opt in” to the case, is not incompatible 
                                                                                                                     
 271. Brief of Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Josendis, 662 F.3d 1292 (No. 09-12266). The 
court ruled on alternative grounds that the employee was not covered by the FLSA and declined to 
rule on the issue that had been briefed by the DOL. Id. at 1320–21. 
 272. 616 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 273. Id. at 1225. 
 274. See, e.g., Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Fast v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 
638 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-1725, 10-1726); Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus 
Curiae, Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-35718). 
 275. See, e.g., Brief of the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1, Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, 
Inc., No. 11-17365 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012); Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6–8, Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-13412); Brief of the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1, Ojeda-Sanchez v. Bland Farms, 
LLC, No. 11-13835, 2012 WL 6012964 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2011).  
 276. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Lopez v. Tyson Foods, 690 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-2344), 2011 WL 
5357150; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Anderson v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 604 
F. Supp. 2d 1339 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (No. 1:06–cv–01000–MEF–WC); Brief for the Secretary of 
Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 
F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-1917), 2010 WL 1130344. 
 277. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 12, Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2010) (Nos. 
08-15290, 08-15154) (invoking Chevron for opinion letters issued in 1982 and 1997); Brief for the 
Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Perez v. Mountaire Farms, 
Inc., 650 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-1917), 2010 WL 1130344, at *19–22 (asserting Chevron 
deference for opinion letters issued in 1973, 1993, 2001, 2006, and 2007). 
 278. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellant at 11–12, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (No. 08-
2820), 2008 WL 5786344. 
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with an opt-out class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.279 The Obama DOL typically cited Skidmore and Christensen 
as the appropriate level of deference for opinion letters and other informal 
guidance,280 and Auer for the agency’s interpretations of its own 
ambiguous regulations in amicus briefs.281  
In fact, the Obama DOL did away with opinion letters altogether, 
replacing them with more general guidance called “Administrator’s 
Interpretations.” The agency explained that the interpretations would be a 
“more efficient and productive use of resources” than individual opinion 
letters focused on narrow factual scenarios, for which “a slight difference 
in the assumed facts may result in a different outcome.”282  
Ironically, while the dismantling of certain FLSA protections was 
quietly accomplished by the Bush administration with an especially 
aggressive amicus strategy, the Obama administration was harshly 
criticized for attempting “regulation-by-amicus.”283 The backlash came in 
response to the Obama DOL’s amicus briefs in cases involving 
pharmaceutical detailers in Christopher. This case was different from 
many of the other cases in which the Obama DOL appeared as an amicus. 
Whereas many of its amicus briefs were filed in cases involving low-wage 
workers, the pharmaceutical detailers in Christopher were more highly 
paid.284 In addition, unlike most of the other cases in which the Obama 
DOL filed amicus briefs, the agency lacked an enforcement record on the 
issue of whether pharmaceutical detailers fell under the outside sales 
exemption.  
The frequency with which the Obama and Bush administrations used 
                                                                                                                     
 279. Consolidated Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 28, Knepper v. Rite Aid, 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-1684, 11-1685), 2011 
WL 10007171, at *28.  
 280. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellant at 15, 23, Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-35718), 
2009 WL 2609879 (citing Skidmore review standard for opinion letters); Brief for the Secretary of 
Labor as Amicus Curiae at 7, Favors v. Apple Creek Mgmt. Co., No. 11-12277 (11th Cir. 2012), 
2012 WL 2510387. 
 281. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 282. See Wage & Hour Division, Rulings and Interpretations (describing Administrator 
Interpretations), http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/opinion.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 283. See, e.g., Mark A. Hoffmann, Overtime Ruling Favors Employers, BUS. INS., June 25, 
2012, at 3 (quoting Richard Alfred, chair of Seyfarth Shaw L.L.P.s national wage and hour 
litigation practice); Lisa Schreter et al., U.S. Supreme Court Holds Pharmaceutical Sales 
Representatives are Exempt Outside Sales Employees and Rebukes DOL’s Efforts to Regulate Via 
Amicus Filings, LITTLER, June 20, 2012, http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/us-
supreme-court-holds-pharmaceutical-sales-representatives-are-exempt.  
 284. Compare Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2164 & n.7 (2012) 
(noting that the petitioners made $72,000 and $76,000 per year, and that the salaries of 
pharmaceutical detailers average in excess of $90,000), with cases cited in notes 272–80 and 
accompanying text. 
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amicus filings to either aggrandize or abrogate worker protection statutes 
caused dramatic swings in the agency’s interpretation of the law. Some of 
the Obama DOL’s attempts to restore FLSA interpretations to pre-Bush era 
policies were rejected by courts because of the inconsistent agency 
positions. For example, in Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, 
LLC,285 the Fifth Circuit refused to defer to the Obama DOL’s position that 
employers may not deduct relocation and visa expenses from the wages of 
H2-B visa workers if their pay would fall below minimum wage.286 The 
DOL’s amicus brief argued that—except for a three-month period at the 
end of the Bush administration, which was changed through new written 
guidance shortly after President Obama took office—the agency had held 
this interpretation for at least fifty years.287 Similarly, some courts 
criticized the “gyrating agency letters” on the issue of the compensability 
of clothes changing for union workers under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).288 The 
Clinton administration had a pro-employee interpretation, the Bush 
administration changed it to a pro-industry position, and the Obama 
administration returned to a pro-employee interpretation.289 
This ping-pong effect is also evident in Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,290 
a seven-year litigation saga that was filed while President Bush was in 
office but carried on into the Obama administration—with the agency flip-
flopping on the appropriate interpretation of the administrative exemption 
during the life of the case.291  
                                                                                                                     
 285. 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 286. Id. at 404. 
 287. En Banc Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees, Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010), (No. 07-
30942), 2010 WL 3049082, at *24. 
 288. E.g. Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 216 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(“[O]ur own view rests upon the language of the statute, not upon the gyrating agency letters on the 
subject.”). 
 289. These interpretive shifts occurred for other worker protection statutes as well. For 
example, the Bush administration had submitted amicus briefs arguing that employees of 
subsidiaries of publicly traded companies are not covered by the whistleblower provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See, e.g., Brief of U.S. Dep’t of Labor, In re Ambrose v. U.S. Foodservice, 
Inc., No. 06-096, 2007 WL 7139500 (U.S. Dept. of Labor SAROX Sept. 28, 2007). Several years 
later, the Obama DOL submitted amicus briefs to the ARB arguing exactly the opposite: that such 
employees are protected by the whistleblower provision. See Brief of the Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health as Amicus Curiae, Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. Tech., Inc., 
273 F. App’x 543 (7th Cir. 2008), (No. 08-032). To overturn the Bush administration view, blessed 
by the Supreme Court, that home healthcare workers are not entitled to overtime, the Obama DOL 
proposed new regulations that would return to the pre-Bush era agency position that such workers 
are non-exempt. Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 76 Fed. Reg. 
81,190, 81,201 (proposed Dec. 27, 2011) (providing that all in-home healthcare workers employed 
by third parties would be entitled to minimum wage and overtime protection). 
 290. No. 04-CV-40346, 2009 WL 596232 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
 291. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (2005); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir. 
2010) (“The DOL’s position on this issue has changed repeatedly in the last twelve years, indicating 
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Quicken Loans concerned whether on-line mortgage bankers fell under 
the administrative exemption from overtime.292 At the time the Quicken 
Loans litigation commenced, DOL guidance provided that loan officers 
were entitled to overtime.293 During the litigation, Quicken Loans’ counsel, 
Robert Davis—who had been the Solicitor of Labor under President 
George H.W. Bush—requested (in his “separate capacity” as counsel for 
the Mortgage Bankers Association) an opinion letter on the question of 
whether the administrative exemption from overtime applied to loan 
officers.294 In response, the DOL—shifting gears from its prior 
interpretations—issued an opinion letter finding that the loan officers 
described would be exempt from the FLSA as administrative employees.295 
Quicken Loans then used the opinion letter to urge the court to give 
deference to the new interpretation under Auer and Long Island Care at 
Home and enter summary judgment in its favor.296 The plaintiffs argued 
that the court should not give any deference to the new opinion letter 
because “it was drafted, negotiated, and obtained by Quicken and its 
litigation counsel through their political connections and partnership with 
the Mortgage Bankers Association.”297  
During the Obama administration, however, the DOL withdrew the 
2006 opinion letter and issued a new Administrator’s Interpretation, AI 
2010-1, which opined that “the typical job duties of a mortgage loan 
officer. . . [did] not qualify as bona fide administrative employees” exempt 
from the FLSA.298 The district court—understandably confused by the 
                                                                                                                     
that we should not defer to its interpretation.”). 
 292. Quicken Loans, 2009 WL 596232 at *1. 
 293. See Letter from Daniel F. Sweeney, Office of Enforcement Policy, Fair Labor Standards 
Team, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (May 17, 1999); Letter from Barbara R. Relerford, Office of 
Enforcement Policy, Fair Labor Standards Team, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Feb. 16, 2001). 
 294. Chad Halcom, Labor Department’s About-Face on OT Muddies Quicken Lawsuits, 
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., July 4, 2010, http://www.workforce.com/article/20100708/NEWS01/ 
307089999# (reporting that Davis represented both Quicken and the Mortgage Bankers Association 
and “obtained the original 2006 labor department opinion in response to a query for the 
association”). 
 295. Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-31 (Sept. 8, 2006), http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/ 
2006/2006_09_08_31_FLSA.pdf. 
 296. Report and Recommendation Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on Liability (DKT. #432) and Report and Recommendation Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Merits (DKT. #434), 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d 
(BNA) 1168, at *52 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2009) (“Defendants now assert in their brief that, because 
the web mortgage bankers’ duties are substantially similar to those of the typical mortgage loan 
officer hypothesized to the DOL the Court should defer to the DOL’s September 2006 Opinion 
Letter and recommend summary judgment in their favor.”). 
 297. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Summary Judgment on Liability, Section 259 
Good Faith, and Willfulness, Henry v. Quicken Loans, No. 2:04-CV 40346 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 
2010). 
 298. Wage & Hour Division, Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-1, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 
(Mar. 24, 2010), available at 
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agency’s interpretive cartwheels—invited the DOL to file an amicus brief 
addressing the degree of deference to be given to the new interpretation.299 
The DOL argued that its interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations 
regarding the administrative exemption was entitled to controlling 
deference under Auer.300 Citing Long Island Care at Home, the DOL 
argued that “[a]n agency may change its interpretation of its own 
regulations, and the interpretation is still entitled to controlling deference, 
as long as the agency explains its change in position and the changed 
interpretation does not create unfair surprise.”301 The agency argued that AI 
2010-1 applied only prospectively, creating no unfair surprise, and 
therefore was entitled to deference under Long Island Care at Home.302  
On the heels of the DOL’s amicus filing, the American Bankers 
Association filed a competing amicus brief arguing that the new 
interpretation “marked a sudden and dramatic shift” in the agency’s 
position and resulted in unfair surprise to the industry’s employers.303 The 
Mortgage Bankers Association then filed a separate suit against the DOL 
challenging the Administrator’s Interpretation as a violation of the APA 
because it was a rule that should have been promulgated pursuant to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.304 Quicken Loans ultimately prevailed 
before the jury.305  
The important cautionary tale from Quicken Loans, Castellanos-
Contreras, and the § 203(o) cases described here is the long-term corrosive 
impact that dramatic swings in agency amicus positions from 
administration to administration will have on three levels: first, respect for 
the agency’s technical expertise; second, compliance with informal agency 
positions; and third, protection for the statutory beneficiaries of the laws 
passed by Congress. As seen in these recent cases involving the DOL as an 
amicus, especially in Christopher and Quicken Loans, the DOL’s amicus 
                                                                                                                     
 http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_1.htm. 
 299. Brief of Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Henry v. Quicken Loans, 15 Wage & Hour 
Cas. 2d (BNA) 1168 (E.D. Mich. 2010), (No. 04-cv-40346). 
 300. Id. at 13. 
 301. Id. at 20 (citation omitted).  
 302. Id. at 26. 
 303. See Brief of Amici Curiae Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, American Bankers Ass’n, American 
Financial Services Ass’n, Consumer Mortgage Coalition, Housing Policy Council, Independent 
Community Bankers of America, and Community Mortgage Banking Project Regarding Level of 
Deference to be Accorded to Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-1 at 1, Henry v. Quicken 
Loans, Inc., 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1168 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 04-cv-40346). 
 304. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v. 
Solis, 864 F. Supp.2d 193 (D.D.C. 2012) (No: 1:11-cv-00073). The MBA’s website has a page 
dedicated to its lawsuit. See DOL Overtime Compensation, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/DOLOvertimeCompensation.htm (last visted Mar. 14, 2013). 
 305. Leslie Selig Byrd et al., Quicken Loans Wins Unexpected Overtime Victory, Nat’l L. Rev., 
Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.natlawreview.com/article/quicken-loans-wins-unexpected-overtime-
victory. 
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position itself—rather than the statutory text passed by Congress—is 
becoming the core of the litigation. The next Part analyzes these normative 
concerns. 
III.  LEGAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE  
AGENCY AMICUS STRATEGY 
As seen in the analysis of the DOL’s amicus activity relating to one 
statute over a span of seven decades, agency amicus briefs can have a 
substantial impact on the judicial interpretation of statutes. One’s political 
perspective likely influences the assessment of whether such amicus 
activity as a tool of policy making on a particular issue is beneficial or 
harmful. Employers benefitted from the Bush administration’s approach of 
trying to constrict the FLSA’s reach and take a less aggressive approach to 
direct enforcement, and expressed outrage at the Obama DOL’s more 
zealous advocacy for workers.306 On the other hand, employee advocates 
complained about the support for industry during the Bush 
administration,307 and applauded the crack down on employers who violate 
the FLSA under President Obama.  
Even though political fluctuations are to be expected, the more 
aggressive amicus strategies of the Bush and Obama administrations have 
caused sharp inconsistencies in agency interpretations unlike any other 
time in the DOL’s history. This Part explores the benefits and dangers of 
the agency amicus strategy and proposes a framework for evaluating 
agency amicus briefs. 
A.  The Benefits and Dangers of the Agency Amicus Strategy 
For courts, agency amicus curiae briefs are helpful in sharing the 
expertise and experience of the agency in its enforcement of the statutory 
scheme passed by Congress. Courts often specifically request agency 
amicus participation to help them make sense of complex and technical 
laws.308 This is embodied in the Skidmore principle, which invites the 
                                                                                                                     
 306. For example, the former Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division under Bush, who 
issued many of the opinion letters that were used in amicus advocacy on behalf of industry during 
the Bush administration, criticized the Obama administration’s enforcement approach as overly 
“punitive.” Ironically, she complained that the DOL “does not have an open or transparent process 
regarding its decisions to file amicus briefs” and that the DOL “has used amicus briefs to announce 
major enforcement policy changes.” Examining Regulatory and Enforcement Actions Under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. 
Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 112th Cong. 24, 30 (2011) (Statement of Tammy D. 
McCutchen, Esq.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg70971/pdf/CHRG-
112hhrg70971.pdf.  
 307. See Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 375–78 
(2008). 
 308. See Watts, supra note 68, at 1034–35 (noting that the “Supreme Court regularly invited 
agencies to file amicus briefs” but lower federal courts rarely do so). 
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agency to share its “body of experience and informed judgment” to help 
guide courts and litigants.309  
Amicus briefs also can be a more flexible, efficient form of advocacy 
than direct litigation. Amicus briefs are less costly than affirmative 
litigation, which can demand years of agency staff resources, and 
rulemaking, which involves expensive and time-consuming notice-and-
comment procedures. As an amicus, the DOL can leave the intricacies and 
expense of factual development and discovery in the case to the litigants 
represented by private counsel, and use its resources to write one brief that 
sets forth the agency’s interpretation of ambiguities in the law. 
Agency amicus briefs can also promote uniformity in statutory 
enforcement. If a recurring systemic issue emerges in FLSA litigation, the 
DOL can appear as an amicus in all of the relevant pending cases and point 
the courts towards the same result. As Justice Scalia once wrote, deferring 
to an agency’s amicus interpretation under Auer “makes the job of a 
reviewing court much easier, and since it usually produces affirmance of 
the agency’s view without conflict in the Circuits, it imparts (once the 
agency has spoken to clarify the regulation) certainty and predictability to 
the administrative process.”310 The flexibility of the amicus brief helps to 
prevent “ossification” of the law by allowing the agency to adapt its 
interpretation to changing circumstances.311  
Nevertheless, as seen by the dramatic interpretive swings in the DOL’s 
amicus activity from Presidents Bush to Obama, amicus policy making can 
result in sharper political fluctuations that are not subjected to public 
scrutiny or the compromises inherent in deliberative processes like 
rulemaking. Of course, one expects that the political direction of and policy 
choices made by administrative agencies will change with the election of a 
new President. But the Bush administration’s exploitation of amicus 
arguments to change policy to favor regulated industries and withdraw 
decades-old DOL interpretations—sometimes in the midst of litigation—
went too far. When the DOL’s work becomes more politically charged, its 
credibility as the authoritative voice regarding labor standards is 
undermined.  
Establishing exemptions from the protections of remedial legislation 
through amicus litigation rather than through more transparent, democratic 
processes threatens the normative principles of public participation, 
reasoned decision making, and accountability underlying our 
administrative state.312 Indeed, these were the principles that motivated the 
                                                                                                                     
 309. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 310. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 311. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247–49 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that restricting Chevron’s scope will ossify statutory law). 
 312. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (noting that APA notice 
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Chevron Court to defer to the agency’s resolution—through rulemaking—
of the clash of opposing interests. “[T]he agency considered the matter in a 
detailed and reasoned fashion.”313 The political choice to narrow the scope 
of the statute was accomplished through a formal public process, not a 
covert amicus litigation strategy. Thus, Chevron respected the political 
choices made by the agency during the administrative lawmaking process, 
but it did not undermine the obligation of the courts to test agency 
decisions for reasonableness and procedural integrity.  
Blind deference to an agency amicus interpretation under Auer 
contradicts the fundamental principle of separation of powers. Deferring to 
an agency’s interpretation of its own vague regulations concentrates the 
lawmaking, enforcement, and review functions in one branch. The 
concentration of so much power in the hands of the agency is especially 
dangerous when abused to favor regulated industries rather than statutorily 
protected groups, undermining the remedial intent of Congress. Even 
Justice Scalia, the author of Auer and a sometimes ardent proponent of 
Chevron deference,314 has recognized the separation of powers problems 
implicated by Auer:  
[W]hile I have in the past uncritically accepted [Auer], I have 
become increasingly doubtful of its validity. On the surface, it 
seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a fortiori 
application—of the rule that we will defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of the statute it is charged with implementing. 
But it is not. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that 
it commits to the implementation of an executive agency, it 
has no control over that implementation (except, of course, 
through further, more precise, legislation). The legislative and 
executive functions are not combined. But when an agency 
promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the 
implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination 
of the rule’s meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an 
exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power, a 
properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems 
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to 
permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as 
                                                                                                                     
and comment procedures are “designed to assure due deliberation”). 
 313. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 314. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 521. As other scholars have noted, Chevron has been a “Magna Carta” promoted by 
conservatives “to deregulate and to demand judicial acquiescence.” Eskridge & Baer, supra note 14, 
at 1087; see also Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 
283, 284, 312 (1986). 
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well.315 
As seen in the DOL’s interpretive shifts under Presidents Bush and 
Obama, Auer prompted an amicus approach to policy making that 
permitted immediate, inconsistent interpretive shifts with each 
administration. Over time, this will undermine public confidence in the 
agency’s expertise and respect for the law. Agencies will be viewed as 
political puppets, captured by the interests groups that favor the President 
in power, rather than technical legal experts and career public servants 
faithfully executing congressional intent on behalf of statutory 
beneficiaries. When the interpretation of a remedial statute becomes a 
political football, courts are left confused rather than educated about the 
proper construction of the statute. And the ultimate losers will be the 
workers whom Congress aimed to protect with the FLSA. 
That is not to say that the agency should refrain from filing amicus 
briefs in private litigation. As the agency entrusted by Congress with the 
power to enforce labor standards, it should not simply sit on the sidelines 
while systemic legal issues emerge in the courts. If the DOL exercises its 
amicus power in harmony with the remedial purpose of the FLSA, the 
agency can be a critical, effective voice on behalf of the workers who are 
protected by the FLSA.  
B.  A Proposed Analytical Framework for Agency Amicus Briefs 
The doctrinal melee over the proper weight that reviewing courts 
should afford to arguments in agency amicus briefs results in part from the 
lack of recognition that agencies sometimes use affirmative amicus 
litigation strategies to mold the law—much like an interest group would—
not simply to share their expertise with the court. This Article has named 
and examined the agency amicus strategy of policy making as it relates to 
the FLSA, under which government amicus advocacy has been prolific and 
important. The analysis offers several guiding principles for agency amicus 
activity. 
First, agencies should define and make publicly available on their 
websites their amicus policy and strategy. This policy should include the 
process by which potential amicus participation will be evaluated, the 
enforcement priority areas and emerging legal issues on which the agency 
will focus, and how that strategy comports with the enabling remedial 
statute with which Congress has entrusted it to enforce. Articulating the 
agency’s amicus priorities would enhance the transparency of the agency’s 
amicus decision making process and provide guidance to litigants. It would 
also help prevent any “unfair surprise” to industry, as discussed in 
Christopher. 
                                                                                                                     
 315. Talk Am. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Second, one consistent thread woven into the Supreme Court’s 
decisions involving DOL amicus briefs from Skidmore through 
Christopher is that informal agency interpretations announced for the first 
time in an amicus brief should be scrutinized more carefully by courts to 
ensure compatibility with the statutory text. Mead and other cases have 
carved out another type of implied delegated authority for which a greater 
level of deference may be appropriate, in the absence of formal 
processes.316 In the case of the FLSA or other remedial statutes, a long and 
consistent interpretation of the statute (as held in Kasten)317  should be 
entitled to greater weight. Thus, amicus briefs that describe how the 
agency’s prior positions and interpretations apply to the facts before the 
court—as the DOL’s amicus briefs did in Skidmore and Auer—should 
likewise be afforded a higher degree of weight and respect.318 
For all other types of informal agency interpretations and amicus 
arguments, the Skidmore rubric should apply. Although a vaguer standard, 
Skidmore requires that the court test agency amicus positions against the 
remedial purposes of the FLSA and other indicators of persuasiveness. 
This has included, “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, 
formality, and relative expertness.”319 If the key authority on which the 
agency relies is a recently-adopted opinion letter or “advisory 
memorandum”—especially if issued in response to an adverse judicial 
decision or requested by a regulated industry group—the court should not 
give the interpretation any deference at all. If the argument is announced 
for the first time in the amicus brief itself, the argument should be 
scrutinized more carefully to ensure compliance with remedial statutory 
purpose and to control for litigating positions and political overreaching.320 
Of course, as administrative law scholars have recognized, clarifying 
the appropriate level of deference to give to an agency’s interpretation may 
perhaps be a mere academic enterprise.321 As the empirical analysis in this 
                                                                                                                     
 316. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31. 
 317. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335–36 
(2011). 
 318. In addition to Kasten, the DOL’s brief in Skidmore, which described the agency’s prior 
enforcement activity that found waiting time compensable in other employment contexts, is an 
example. Brief on Behalf of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States 
Department of Labor, as Amicus Curiae at 6, Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), 1944 
WL 42828, at *6–7. 
 319. 533 U.S. at 228 (footnotes omitted). 
 320. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212–13 (1988) (rejecting interpretation 
advanced for the first time in a litigation brief). 
 321. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions 
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 98 (2011) (arguing that studies about judicial review of agency 
action suggest that scholars “should spend less time engaging in debates about the alleged 
differences among the remarkably similar judicial review doctrines and about the circumstances in 
which each should be applied” and “focus instead on the three common elements of the doctrines: 
consistency with applicable statutes, consistency with available evidence, and quality of agency 
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Article shows, most courts rule in a manner consistent with the agency’s 
interpretation, typically without defining the appropriate deference 
standard or referring to the agency’s arguments at all. Other scholars have 
found that judges—especially Supreme Court Justices—are likely to rule 
based on their ideological preferences rather than dutifully sort through the 
texts of statutes and regulations to divine legislative intent.322 In a study of 
workplace law cases, however, Professors James Brudney and Corey 
Ditslear found that the Justices’ reliance on legislative history to review 
agency action led to less politicized results, at least among the more liberal 
members of the Court.323  
Despite its mushiness, Skidmore’s instruction that courts test any 
amicus position for “the power to persuade” provides the most respect for 
separation of powers, and congressional will in particular. A key 
component of Skidmore review, lacking in the Christopher majority 
opinion, must be whether the agency’s interpretation comports with the 
“remedial and humanitarian purpose” of the law. This is more critical in 
the context of workplace laws and other remedial statutes designed to 
protect a less advantaged or powerful group (like lower-wage workers) 
from a more powerful group.324 This purpose pulls strongly in favor of 
interpreting statutory coverage expansively and exemptions from the law 
narrowly.325 Consistent with the principle of separation of powers, courts 
should err on the side of favoring agency interpretations that reinforce 
Congress’s goal of worker protection and be highly skeptical of agency 
positions that undermine it.  
This framework does not mean that all pro-employee amicus 
interpretations offered by the DOL must be accepted automatically by the 
courts. If the agency is urging a new interpretation that is not supported by 
prior agency interpretations or positions, courts should apply Skidmore—
not Auer deference—and independently examine and interpret the FLSA’s 
statutory text. Both the majority and dissent in Christopher followed this 
approach. But the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs were exempt had 
                                                                                                                     
reasoning.”); Raso & Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1817 (finding that “Justices apply deference 
doctrine inconsistently, responding to their ideological preferences, the policies underlying the 
major deference regimes, and the preferences of Congress and the President”). 
 322. Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 
2193, 2193–30 (2009) (discussing studies that found “highly politicized” voting patterns in judicial 
review of agency action). 
 323. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative 
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 173 (2008). 
 324. The analysis may be different with less protective legislation, like criminal or immigration 
law, but should apply in other contexts involving in which Congress designed the law to protect a 
vulnerable or exploited group, such as consumers. 
 325. Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 597; see also A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 
(1945) (“To extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and 
spirit is to abuse the interpretive process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.”). 
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to skirt around the well-established principle that courts should err on 
reading FLSA coverage broadly and exemptions strictly. The majority 
opinion reflected more concern for the potential “massive liability” on the 
pharmaceutical industry than for the overtime rights of the plaintiffs.326 
Such public policy concerns about the costs of compliance should be 
weighed by Congress, not the judiciary. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court understood this important distinction in the 
early days of the FLSA. Just a year after Skidmore, the Court rejected a 
DOL interpretation, developed under pressure from the coal mining 
industry, that miners were not entitled to compensation for the time spent 
travelling in underground mines.327 Finding such travel time compensable 
would have imposed massive liability on the coal mining industry, which 
led to a compromise between the mining industry and labor unions that it 
could be excluded. The Court found that argument “legally untenable” 
under the FLSA and therefore unworthy of respect.328 Jewell Ridge 
ultimately prompted Congress to pass the Portal-to-Portal Act to limit the 
compensability of travel time and de minimus time.329 But it was the 
province of the legislature—not the judiciary or the executive—to amend 
the statute to narrow its coverage. As eloquently stated by the Court in 
Tennessee Coal: “We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of 
trade but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full 
measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.”330  
Courts should heed the early lessons offered by Skidmore and Jewell 
Ridge. To the extent that the agency is articulating an amicus argument—
unsupported by rulemaking or prior agency interpretations—on behalf of a 
regulated entity rather than an individual falling within the statute’s 
protection, it should not be entitled to any deference or respect. Decisions 
to exempt regulated parties from remedial statutes should occur only 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking or democratic processes, not 
furtive litigation strategies or amicus briefs. To the extent this may ossify 
or bolster fair labor standards, it is a burden that regulated entities, not 
statutory beneficiaries, should bear.  
If this standard had been applied in Long Island Care at Home and 
other cases in which the Bush DOL used amicus briefs to overturn pro-
employee interpretations and elevate the interests of the regulated, the 
result in these cases may have been different. Chevron and Auer, however, 
allowed the Bush administration to hide behind a judicial presumption that 
the agency was enforcing the underlying purposes of the FLSA, while it 
systematically dismantled worker protections that had been built over 
                                                                                                                     
 326. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012). 
 327. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 170 (1945).  
 328. Id. at 169.  
 329. Portal to Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, § 4, 61 Stat. 84. 
 330. Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 597. 
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many decades. Courts should not permit agencies to use the powerful 
sword of amicus filings, sheathed under the guise of deference doctrine, to 
inflict such violence on the remedial goals of Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
As seen in the example of amicus activity in wage and hour cases, the 
DOL has used amicus strategies to emasculate and aggrandize its statutory 
mandate. Agency amicus briefs typically provide valuable interpretive 
guidance to courts about the statutory scheme under consideration. But 
they also risk improper manipulation in ways that undermine democratic 
lawmaking values and separation of powers. Although agency 
interpretations advanced for the first time in amicus briefs may be entitled 
to respect under Skidmore, they rarely qualify for Chevron deference.  
Regardless of the purported deference regime argued, however, courts 
tend to rule consistently with the position advanced in agency amicus 
briefs. On the whole, this is desirable, so long as the agency is offering its 
expertise in a way that remains faithful to the public policy purpose 
established by Congress in the underlying statute. The powerful, stealth 
influence that agency amicus curiae briefs can have on courts requires that 
judges be more mindful of their responsibility to test agency interpretations 
against the remedial purposes of worker protection laws and the 
democratic values of transparency, public accountability, and reasoned 
decision making. 
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